

# THEOLOGY

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## EDITORIAL

THE article printed below on "The Passion of God" deals with a problem of widespread interest. On its theological side it has been dealt with in Dr. Mozley's monograph, *The Impassibility of God*, and in the essay by Baron von Hügel to which Mr. Stratton refers. Both alike express the reluctance of Catholic thought to regard God as suffering. The other view, which is that adopted by our contributor, plays a considerable part in Archbishop Temple's theology, and has been the subject of frequent popular exposition from Mr. Studdert-Kennedy. Our own sympathies are with the older and more traditional view, which seems to us closer to the thought of the New Testament as a whole, and to rest on a deeper analysis of the meanings of suffering and joy. The whole New Testament attitude to, and thought of, God is governed, we would urge, by belief in the victorious fact of our Lord's Resurrection and Ascension; and the thought of the Passion is never divorced from this its glorious issue. The true counterpart of the  $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$  in our Lord's teaching, that is to say, seems not to be an ultimacy of suffering in the life of God, but rather a  $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\eta\nu\alpha\iota$  in the life of the Incarnate. We stand, however, confessedly before a great mystery, and no serious and reverent meditation upon it will be amiss.

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The settlement of the Roman question in Italy has been recognized throughout Christendom as a matter for rejoicing, though its precise importance is as yet difficult to assess. On the one hand, the Concordat, which secures religious education in all the schools of Italy, must bring encouragement to all who are fighting for the same cause in other parts of Christendom. On the other, the claim to the Temporal Power seems no easier than before to reconcile with the principles of Him who declared that His Kingdom was not of this world.



## EVOLUTION AND THE MODERNIST: "IS IT PEACE?"

THE provision of what is called the "non-stop train" is a recent change in the railway practice in this country. The change occasionally produces unfortunate results. Owing to the fact that you cannot leave a train when you please, but only, as it were, when the train pleases, the passenger has to exercise a greater care than of yore in selecting the train to which he commits himself. For, if he does not do so, he may find that he is carried past the station at which he wished to alight, and deposited at a destination that he had not dreamed of visiting. In a like manner, the unwary traveller in the world of the intellect is liable to find that his train of logic is one that carries him past the point at which he expected that it would stop, and that it lands him in a wholly unexpected conclusion. Some such fate as this seems to await the Modernist when his proposals are carried to their final and inescapable issue.

The first edition of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* was published in November, 1859, a date that marks the beginning of a vast and revolutionary change in scientific thought. The scientific work so soundly begun by Darwin has been but little modified since his death, and the principle of evolution in the processes of nature is now admittedly discoverable alike in the change from a spiral nebula to a habitable planet, and in the development of organic life that culminates in man. The recognition of the truth of that principle of development has now, in fact, become current coin, accepted on all hands.

In the earlier years that followed 1859 this all-conquering view of our surroundings was seen to be inconsistent with the then current tenets of Christianity, and new views arose among the English clergy. In 1874, fifteen years after the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, a work by W. R. Greg made its appearance. This book, on account of the prescience displayed therein, is even more interesting now than it was at the time when it was issued. It was entitled *Rocks Ahead, or the Warnings of Cassandra*, and, in the section on "The Religious Rock," he mentions that a "... Divorce (and latent antagonism) between the highest intellects of the Nation and the National Belief is in progress ..." (p. 129); and, in a note on the same page, he adds that he finds strong corroboration of that view "in the disposition so manifest of late years among the most large-minded of our Divines to modify, volatilize, ignore, eliminate, or cover with a mystical and nebulous halo (as Coleridge did), some of the least credible features of their creed." This



was the origin, historically and intellectually, of the views that are now known as Modernist. The very purpose of Modernism is to meet the new conditions that have arisen with the spread of the general assent that Evolution now commands. Modernism has grown with the diffusion of evolutionary conceptions in such a fashion that it now forms a school of thought that is able to claim a numerous and increasing body of adherents. It is, in fact, already so prominent that it becomes important to inquire into the validity of its claim to be at agreement with our knowledge of the evolutionary process. This question has been scarcely discussed from its scientific side. The position assumed by Modernism has been attacked almost exclusively from a theological point of view, and it is unfortunate that men of science, regarding the whole dispute as merely another domestic quarrel among theologians, have ignored it altogether. The argument as to whether the Modernist reconstruction of theology has, or has not, been carried to a point incompatible with the Christian Creed has obscured the question, not less critical to the Modernist, whether that reconstruction has been carried far enough to establish a *concordat* with the claims of Evolution.

When we proceed, accordingly, to ask how far that reconstruction has gone, we find that Modernism is, in fact, a revival of the Arianism of other days, but that it now appears in a changed form. Its very purpose is, admittedly, to recast the Christian Faith in the mould of Evolution, and to reject, to "vaporize" as Greg says, all that cannot be contained within the limits of the mould. Thus, for example, the historicity of the Virgin Birth of our Lord, and of His physical Resurrection and Ascension, is denied. The Miracles (especially the "Nature-miracles") vanish, and have "no evidential value." To the Modernist, such beliefs as these are incompatible with scientific knowledge. He regards them, therefore, as not objectively true, but as ideas that retain value as reasons for conduct. They are removed from the category of recorded matters-of-fact, and are relegated to the category of subjective impressions. I do not stay to inquire into the worth of the ideas that belong to this latter category, or whether they possess more than the warmth of a painted fire. It forms no part of my purpose to do so. I am not concerned with the theological doubts and negations that Evolution has introduced into the mind of the Modernist. My question is related only with that which he still affirms; with, that is, the residuum of Religious Belief whose objective truth he is still prepared to maintain. I propose to ask, from a strictly scientific point of view, whether it is possible to include this residuum within the boundaries of Evolution.



What, then, do we find in this residuum? Dr. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, in his book, *The Way of Modernism* (Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 149, expresses himself as follows: "So the Christianity that is refashioned by the Evolutionary knowledge of today will be bold to proclaim the old gospel of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Kingdom of God . . ." And, *op. cit.*, p. 86, he writes: "The great fact that stands out is that in the evolutionary process the emergence of good has taken place"; and, again on p. 86, he says that "the whole process is Divine, and we are led by a continuous chain from the lower to the higher in the evolution of human personality, till we come to the One Manifestation in which men have most fully found and seen and known God." Therefore, *op. cit.*, p. 81, "recognizing the unity and continuity that science proclaims we can have a doctrine of the significance of Jesus which the evolutionist will not quarrel with, the Theologian could still describe as a doctrine of Incarnation, and Religion would find adequate to its deepest and purest demands." Thus, at the base of the Modernist residuum, we find the assertion that in the evolutionary process the emergence of good has taken place, and, at the apex, the conception that the Incarnation occurred in the course of evolutionary development. As Dr. Bethune-Baker puts it, *op. cit.*, p. 89: "From the evolutionary point of view, He (our Lord) was the product of the past—He was on the highway of Man's history." To the Modernist, then, the Incarnation—the Advent of a Messiah—was not an irruption from without the circle of an evolutionary environment—it occurred, that is, *ab intra*, not *ab extra*.

The Modernist, in fact, has appealed to the Evolutionary conception—and to nothing beyond. To that conception, then, he shall go—and no further.

Neither inorganic nor organic evolution shows any sign of beneficence on the part of the Creator. In the inorganic world we find no sort of relevance to ourselves. Men in a ship in an otherwise empty ocean sometimes behold the splendour and the beauty of a gorgeous sunset. But the scene was not set for their delectation; if the ship had not been there, if the ocean had indeed been empty, would the unseen splendour have been less? Is the earthquake stayed because the land is populous? It is not. The processes of the inorganic world, helpful or harmful, go their way with no reference to ourselves. Gazing upon them we find only sheer indifference.

It is the same in the world of organic evolution. There we find that we are looking at a palimpsest wherein the writing that appears upon the surface is contradicted by that, not less true,



which lies below. Looking at the writing above, we see a world that is full of the joy of life; we see the swift, graceful and perfect, sweep through the air shrilly rejoicing in existence. But if we look at that which is written underneath, we find the record of the ruthless slaughter that went to the making of that grace and rejoicing. Before that perfection was reached, uncounted millions, not so flawlessly formed, not so perfectly adapted to their environment, have, in their less ability, perished miserably of hunger. Plants and animals produce their seeds or their young in vast excess. But the surface of the earth is already fully occupied. "Only one pair of young can grow up to take the place of the pair, male and female, which have launched a dozen, or it may be a hundred thousand, young individuals on the world. . . . Eventually those survive which are most fitted to the special conditions under which this particular organism has to live. The "struggle for existence" of Darwin is the struggle amongst all the superabundant young of a given species, in a given area, to gain protection from heat, cold, moisture, and dryness. One pair in the new generation—only one pair—survive for every parental pair . . . in Nature's struggle for existence; death, immediate obliteration, is the fate of the vanquished, whilst the only reward of the victors, few, very few, but rare and beautiful in the fitness which has carried them to victory . . . is the permission to reproduce their kind—to carry on by heredity to another generation the specific qualities by which they triumphed" (*The Kingdom of Man*, by E. Ray Lankester, D.Sc., F.R.S., Constable and Co., 1907). We see the end, the rejoicing of the triumphant, for that is before our eyes. But, when we look below, the scene is one of misery and suffering on a scale that baffles the imagination. The upper writing is cancelled by the lower; neither a plus nor a minus remains, and we find that the sheer indifference prevailing in the inorganic world is repeated also in the animal world.

The Modernist, however, may urge that the long travail of organic evolution in the past has brought forth Man, a being whose life, endowed with spiritual and moral power, is exempt from the indifference that the Creator has displayed in the inorganic and the animal worlds. Here, in a creature gifted with Reason, and the power of looking before and after, a point may have been reached where the aloofness is abated. But it is not so. Not even here can the Modernist find rest for the sole of his foot. Professor Huxley has discussed this aspect of the matter in one of his lectures (*The Romanes Lecture, 1893—Evolution and Ethics*, by Thomas H. Huxley, F.R.S., Macmillan and Co., 1893), where, speaking of the culture of Ancient Greece, he points out that ". . . the very sharpening of the sense and that subtle



refinement of emotion, which brought such a wealth of pleasures, were fatally attended by a proportional enlargement of the capacity for suffering; and the divine faculty of imagination, while it created new heavens and new earths, provided them with the corresponding hells of futile regret for the past and morbid anxiety for the future." Here also, then, in purely human development, the direction in which the process moves is as neutral as it is in the inorganic or the animal world. The movement—the progress—is neither to the right nor to the left, neither towards greater happiness nor towards greater suffering, but only in the direction of a greater capacity for either. The advantage of an ever-increasing sensibility is to be found in its survival-value; in, that is, the greater adaptability to environment that is conferred by its possession. The greater and greater acquisition of this advantage can be traced throughout the long ascent from the amœba to man. No subjective gift is bestowed. If we set the loss against the gain it becomes meaningless to speak of "lower" or "higher things"; an equality in the suffering and the gain will be found in the moral and spiritual world not less than elsewhere; if we are brought nearer to Heaven, so, *pari passu*, are we brought nearer to Hell. If a weight is placed in one scale of the balance, an equivalent weight is simultaneously placed in the other. It is true that the total weight that is carried is increased, but the balance itself remains unmoved.

Thus, within the evolutionary process, we find no sign from above, no recognition. No voice speaks from the void, and the unbroken silence is the silence of sheer indifference. Nevertheless, the Modernist, whose premises are included within the boundaries of that process, asks us to recognize the Goodness of God and an Incarnation as consistent with evolutionary development. From a scientific point of view his claim must be disallowed. Our knowledge of the evolutionary process does not permit such a conclusion to be drawn. Neither the base nor the apex of Modernism can be reconciled with the uniformly observed order. In its essence, the Modernist's claim is teleological; it savours rather of Paley than of Darwin. If he would justify his position, it is incumbent upon him to produce, not a new Christian Theology, but a new Theory of Evolution. To put the matter briefly, he has to demonstrate, as a matter of observed fact, that the distribution of the rain discloses a partiality in favour of the fields of the Just.

This is the terminus of my argument. It will be seen that my thesis deals exclusively with the claim that, when Christianity is confined within the Evolutionary aspect of our life, certain affirmations may be still retained. On examination,



not from a theological but from a scientific point of view, I find that this claim is inadmissible.

Our thoughts, however, cannot be stayed there. The suggestion arises in the mind to the effect that, if concession does not save the views of the Modernist, then *a fortiori*, the ancient Creed is destroyed. If the one falls, it may be asked, how can the other stand? I am overrunning my terminus if I enter upon this question, but, nevertheless, I cannot abstain from adding a few sentences. For if, as I hold, considerations are forthcoming that, looking beyond the evolutionary process, make a true Theophany, an Incarnation *ab extra*, not *ab intra*, an event that is rationally to be expected, then the position is totally changed, and the fall of the one does not involve the fall of the other. Here, I cannot so much as mention those considerations, nor have I even indicated their nature. But he in whose mind they are present—he, that is, to whom an *a priori* Messianic philosophy is sound, and who may, perhaps, be even more concerned with the philosophical expectation than with the fulfilment of it—will find, marvelling, the *a posteriori* complement of his philosophy in the Life recorded by the Evangelists. He will see before him One who (Matt. v. 43-48; Luke xiii. 1-5, *et alibi*), not merely admitted, but unflinchingly asserted and emphasized the indifference of our surroundings. He will find in the record One who, coming from Reality and *ab extra*, used His power over winds and waves as having evidential value in demonstrating what I may call His externality. He will find that his logical conclusion is divided from that of the Modernist by all the width of the sky. For, to him, the Silence is not unbroken, and the Indifference itself becomes significant.

ARTHUR JOHN HUBBARD, M.D.

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## THE PASSION OF GOD

### I

Joy and suffering—is there room for both of these in the divine nature? If man's religious needs are to be satisfied, surely we must say that there is. St. Paul's religious genius seemed to find both joy and suffering in God. The Epistle to the Philippians, written in captivity towards the end of his life, is dominated by the note of joy; yet he is never tired of suffering, and suffering not only for the sake of Christ but together with Christ. For St. Paul, at any rate, both joy and suffering seem to have a place in the divine life, and is not this the case with



religious experience in general? If, on the one hand, the man who has well-nigh finished his course finds his truest peace in God's abiding joy, yet, on the other hand, the young man on the threshold of life's adventure finds his greatest inspiration in the thought of a suffering God who is with him in the thick of the fight. Judged simply by the needs of man's religious nature, it would seem that it is a God in whom suffering and joy both have a place who can help him most.

But to argue from this fact of man's nature, if fact it be, to the existence of both joy and suffering in God would be anthropomorphism, of the very worst kind unless the argument can be supported by revelation or experience. It is, therefore, the purpose of this article, while briefly summarizing the case for finding in God abiding and overflowing joy, to advance certain facts of revelation which seem to indicate that God also suffers, and then to seek to reconcile belief in divine suffering with belief in God as the essence of joy.

There is a grandeur in the conception of a suffering God which may leave us in danger of forgetting what is of value in the conception of God's limitless joy. It was with this danger in mind that the late Baron Friedrich von Hügel delivered, some years ago, an address\* which recalls us to that thought of the divine beatitude and vindicates its value as a religious belief.

Von Hügel begins with an examination of the two great currents of thought which have met in historic Christianity—the Hellenic-Hellenistic and the Israelitish-Jewish. In the first current he takes us behind the actual thought forms of the writers to the deep religious feeling which animates their words. Plato in the discourse of Diotima† is typical. Plato, says von Hügel, is there apprehending "a Reality supremely happy and happy-making, an overflowing peace and joy." Again, Aristotle also witnesses to the Pure Joy of God, and in Plotinus is found "the most impressive, because the most sensitively religious, of all non-Jewish and non-Christian Greek apprehensions of God as Pure Beatitude and overflowing Beatifier."

The Israelitish-Jewish current is very different. Jahveh not only thinks, feels, wills and loves, but He can be angry and fierce. He can change His mind, and can originate physical and moral evils. But although Jahveh is conceived in this extremely anthropopathic fashion, yet "the entire Israelitish conception of God," says von Hügel, "circles too exclusively round Jahveh's awful power and unapproachableness to admit of suffering within Him even by implication." Thus we may infer rather the beatitude of God. In the whole stream of Israelitish-

\* *Suffering and God.* (Essays and Addresses, 2nd series.)

† *Symposium* 209D-212A.



Jewish thought it is only in Isaiah's song of the Lord's Vineyard (Isa. v. 1-7) and Ezekiel's description of the Good Shepherd (Ezek. xxxiv. 11 ff.) that we seem to be moving towards suffering in God—and there the final step is never taken.

But a third current of thought—the Patristic—also contributed to the Christian doctrine of God, and between this and the two earlier, and more or less contemporary, currents there had intervened “the words, deeds, implications, and temper of mind of Jesus as they are portrayed by the Synoptic Gospels.” On this question of suffering and God, it would seem that there have emerged from the recorded life of Jesus and from Patristic thought two divided currents. One of them, the main stream, is in line with what had gone before in the two pre-Christian currents; the other and lesser stream differs from earlier thought, and makes God intensely personal as against the Greeks, and a sufferer as against the Jews. The passages relevant to these two diverging currents in Christian thought have been brought together and examined by Dr. J. K. Mozley in his book *The Impassibility of God*, and to that we may refer for a full treatment of Patristic thought on the subject.

Speaking of this last and divided current of thought von Hügel points out that it was the lesser of its two streams which gave rise to the Patripassian heresy, while it was partly in conflict with Patripassianism that the main stream developed. There is, undoubtedly, a changed emphasis in the conception of God due to the life and death of Jesus with the resultant doctrine of a suffering Messiah. Nevertheless, says von Hügel, Jesus in such an utterance as the Great Rejoicing (St. Luke x. 21 ff.) only expresses vividly what His whole bearing conveys in many other passages also—that God is joy, perfect and unutterable. Falling back on the doctrine of the Two Natures, von Hügel argues that in Christ as Man we have suffering, overflowing suffering, and in God we have overflowing sympathy, but not suffering because He is supreme joy.

## II

So far we have given no more than a sorely compressed summary of what a great master-mind had to say on the doctrine of the Divine Beatitude, and we have done so because it is a thought we cannot afford to ignore. But what of the doctrine of Divine Suffering? It is with this that both von Hügel's address and this present article are concerned and it is to this we will now pass.

We have seen that von Hügel, in his examination of the Israelitish-Jewish current of thought, can find no doctrine of Divine Suffering; yet he does admit that there is a tendency



towards such a doctrine. This tendency, we would suggest, should not be passed over or forgotten. Again it may be disputed whether the Baron is right in saying that the verse about crucifying "the Lord of Glory" (1 Cor. ii. 8) stands "alone in the New Testament as to its 'Patrician' sound." Further, although von Hügel admits a distinction between sin and suffering, yet he seems to identify them too closely. He is aware of the danger to morality from a certain kind of treatment of the doctrine of divine suffering, but is it therefore necessary to condemn any treatment of the doctrine on those grounds? To the present writer it seems that morality is rather safeguarded when suffering, especially divine suffering, is believed to be due to human sin, and that it is just the belief in the suffering of God, suffering caused by man's sin, which gives to sin its dread reality. But the real crux of the whole question lies in the significance of a suffering Messiah. Von Hügel admits that in the historical development of theology it was an easy transition from the doctrine of a suffering Messiah to the doctrine of a suffering God. Is there any justification for this transition? Is there anything in the life, passion, and death of Jesus as the suffering Messiah which might lead us on to belief in a suffering God? It is this point which we now hope to elucidate.

We shall naturally turn to the historical records as given us in the Synoptic Gospels, and if there is one fact in these Gospels unshaken by critical investigation it is the God-consciousness of Jesus, that strong and intense communion with God which is the outstanding characteristic of His life. It is a communion so close that there is never for one moment a sign of any barrier between Himself and God. So intimate is the relationship that its only adequate expression is in the terms "Father" and "Son." Except for the moment of desolation on the Cross we can point to no time in the life of Jesus when He is not conscious of direct personal communion with God. From "Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?" to "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit" it is always present. And yet it is not a static, unchanging thing. There are times when it becomes all-absorbing and rises high above the accustomed level to form peaks which are radiant with the divine glory. The God-consciousness of Jesus reflects in a startling way the Old Testament conception of the living God.

When we come to examine this communion of Jesus with the Father there are four peaks especially which stand out like the giants of a mountain range. They are the Baptism, the Temptations, the incident at Cæsarea Philippi, and the Transfiguration. All are marked by an intense nearness to God



and a vivid awareness of the heavenly Father as in a special way the Father of Jesus Christ. At the Baptism Jesus, at least, is conscious of a voice saying: "Thou art my Son, the beloved," and the Spirit descends from God leading Him first of all to the wilderness temptations. The temptations themselves are presented in such a way as might be calculated to lead Him to presume on His sense of divine Sonship, but instead He resists them by an unhesitating reference to God's commands and with a clear and profound insight into God's will. Again, when Jesus questions the twelve at Cæsarea Philippi as to His own Person it is with an exalted sense of His divine authority as Messiah, and perhaps even as Son. St. Peter's answer to His question He regards as a revelation from "my Father which is in heaven." Then, lastly, at the Transfiguration we see Him enfolded in an experience of divine glory, and once more He is conscious of the voice saying: "Thou art my son, the beloved." While it is true, therefore, that the God-consciousness of Jesus never deserted Him, yet in these four experiences we see it revealed on a level much higher than it seems normally to have held.

Now in all these experiences there is, besides the fact of the God-consciousness itself, another element which we may call the consciousness of the *δεῖ παθεῖν*. The phrase *δεῖ παθεῖν* occurs only in connection with the incident at Cæsarea Philippi, but in the Transfiguration narrative the thought is exactly the same, and in the Baptism and Temptations the same keynote is found. The voice at the Baptism combines with the affirmation of Sonship a phrase from Isa. xlii. 1 which refers to the Suffering Servant, a figure regarded by Jesus as prophetic of His Passion. With regard to the Temptations, we may say that if they are viewed as possibilities which presented themselves to Jesus as He pondered the method to be followed in founding His Kingdom, then, in rejecting those possibilities, He chose deliberately the method which we call the way of the Cross. At Cæsarea Philippi we have the clear assertion—*δεῖ παθεῖν*, the Son of man *must suffer*; and as He returns from the Mount of Transfiguration with the chosen three the thought is identical, and the emphasis on necessity is only less clear because of the *oratio obliqua*.

At all these moments of supreme God-consciousness, therefore, the thought of the Passion runs through them like a recurring *motif*, and in two, if not all, of these experiences, it is seen as a matter of necessity, a divine "must." Just at those moments in the life of our Lord when His never-ceasing communion with the Father is most intense, then He is most aware of a necessity of suffering, a *δεῖ παθεῖν*. We are therefore led



to ask, since the  $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$  idea has so close a connection with the God-consciousness, whether it may perhaps have some place in the life of God.

What are those peaks of God-consciousness in which the thought of the necessity of suffering so consistently appears? At once we must say that they cannot be regarded as the highest points of communion yet established between a human soul and God. They are, indeed, altogether outside the range of human experience and belong to the life of the Eternal Father and the Eternal Son. "No one knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." That is the God-consciousness at its highest, and it is an utterance from the early "Q" tradition. No real grounds can be urged for rejecting it from the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, and in it we have a sure foundation for the traditional Christology. Jesus was the Eternal Son of God who in becoming man humbled Himself, putting aside something of His Godhead in a voluntary *kenosis*. What, then, if in those peaks of God-consciousness the veil of *kenosis* is nearest to being lifted? What if, to put it crudely, we see our Lord in those experiences drawing heavily on the fund of deity left Him by the *kenosis*, living before our eyes His eternal life with the Father so far as was consistent with His self-imposed humiliation? If we may think of His God-consciousness along these lines, then we have a glimpse into the very inner life of God, and we are allowed to overhear the counsels of the Divine Persons. What are those counsels? They centre round a  $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$ . Within the Godhead is recognized and accepted the necessity of suffering, and one of the Divine Persons is willing to bear it.

All this, perhaps, will be readily admitted. It will be said that such was the divine counsel, but it referred only to a definite temporal event and was entirely fulfilled within the sphere of the Incarnate life. Yet others have seen in the temporal event of Christ's passion and death a sacrament and symbol of an eternal reality and have found for the Incarnate life a counterpart in the life of God as He is related to the world through all the ages. In other words, they have thought of some age-long suffering in God and of the Passion and Cross of Christ as a revelation of it. Does the  $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$  idea and its close connection with the God-consciousness of Jesus afford any ground for such a belief?

In the life of Christ we can see something of the purpose in this necessity of suffering, and perhaps a consideration of that purpose will show how there may be even now a necessity of suffering in the life of God. According to the New Testament writers, the suffering and death of Christ had a purpose in



relation to sin. It was undergone *περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν* and *περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου*. Here, then, the *δεῖ παθεῖν* is brought into relation with an age-long fact. Sin did not cease at the Crucifixion, but is still today strong and subtle in its power.

Again, according to a modern interpretation like that of Schweitzer, Christ's Passion was a *πειρασμός* endured for the sake of bringing in the Kingdom of God, and here, again, the *δεῖ παθεῖν* is related to an age-long purpose. The Kingdom has not yet come. It is still being brought in and every *πειρασμός* of the world may bring it nearer.

Nor are these two interpretations irreconcilable. Inasmuch as every *πειρασμός* is the result of sin, to endure the *πειρασμός* for the sake of the Kingdom is also to suffer for the world's sin. Moreover, both sin and the Kingdom are meaningless, apart from God. Sin is only rightly so-called if it is an offence against God, and the Kingdom is the Kingdom of God. Both sin and the Kingdom are in direct relationship to God, and yet they are diametrically opposed to each other. Sin and the Kingdom must necessarily be in conflict, and because of their relationship to God that conflict cannot leave Him unmoved. The *πειρασμός* for the Kingdom which sin produces on earth, which is in some measure always present in the world, must have some counterpart in an age-long *πειρασμός* experienced by God. This is very near to declaring that *δεῖ παθεῖν* is a law for God—self-imposed, no doubt—which is older than the Incarnation and lasting when Christ's earthly sojourn is ended.

We may try to put the same thought in philosophical language, and say that the Kingdom of God, which means the absolute divine rule, would be the complete immanence of the transcendent One. But that complete immanence is not yet. At the most we have varying degrees of immanence, here a little and there a little, but nowhere absolute. Yet, if the Kingdom expressed as complete immanence be God's purpose, why is that complete immanence not yet achieved? It is the same question as "Why has the Kingdom of God not yet come?" and the answer, also, is the same—because there is a power which thwarts immanence and the Kingdom, and that power is sin. Whichever way we put it, it means that God's will is thwarted. What is this thwarting of God? That depends on the character of God. If God is, as we believe, Love, then, when He is thwarted, He must suffer, since Love, if it is thwarted, must needs suffer. Thus there is a parallel all the way through, and the life of Christ is indeed the image of the life of God. Christ came to found the Kingdom and met the opposition of sin; God's purpose also is to establish His Kingdom,



and He is all the time faced by sin. The forces of sin which attempted to thwart Christ combined to form a *πειρασμός* which He met and bore on the Cross, and the conflict between sin and God's purpose forms for God an age-long *πειρασμός* which is the thwarting of His will and must in a God of Love involve suffering.

A recent writer on the Atonement\* has declared himself for the doctrine of Divine Impassibility, but it is important to notice that he interprets Impassibility as meaning that God is never "acted upon," is never "passive." God is always "by virtue of His own nature perfect Love and that Love in the face of human sin appears as "compassion." Yet He is still active not acted upon. . . . God is impassible in Himself, but full of compassion in respect of us." How the writer would interpret this compassion we see in a footnote wherein he meets some of the points raised by von Hügel. The divine compassion, it would seem, can be called no less than suffering, though it is suffering imposed by no necessity but deliberately willed and accepted by God's Holy Love. That is precisely what we have seen in respect of the *δεῖ παθεῖν* of Christ, and so, too, it must be conceived if we speak of a *δεῖ παθεῖν* in God. It is not to be thought of as imposed upon God by some outward necessity, but it is deliberately willed by Him in accordance with the law of His own being—the infinite love of One who is all-holy. In that the *δεῖ παθεῖν* of Christ is also an image of an age-long *δεῖ παθεῖν* in God.

Such a doctrine of divine suffering we believe not to be open to the more serious objections which von Hügel raises. He fears lest such teaching should lead to the treatment of suffering as not really evil at all, and lest there should be a minimizing of the exceeding sinfulness of sin. But suffering which consists in the thwarting of the God of love, and which is the direct outcome of human sin, cannot be regarded as other than evil, and cannot but mean the utter condemnation of the sin which causes it. Such a doctrine, moreover, is consistent with the view that sin and this consequent divine suffering arise from the free-will of man given by God at the cost of His own loving self-limitation. Thus we can see that God's suffering is not only voluntarily endured, but we can also have an answer to the problem of evil which von Hügel in his address is content to leave unsolved. Further, if *all* suffering has its origin in sin, then this suffering of God is one with our suffering, and we need not be content with finding in God overflowing sympathy—we can also know Him as our fellow-sufferer.

\* P. Hartill, *The Necessity of Redemption*.



## III

All these are important considerations for vital religion, and they follow from the doctrine of divine suffering we have endeavoured to outline. But what of the equally vital doctrine of the divine beatitude? Must that be abandoned if we accept this belief in God's sufferings, or can these two seemingly contradictory thoughts in any way be reconciled?

Let us enquire wherein the suffering of God inflicted by the forces of evil consists. We have suggested that the age-long *πειρασμός* of God is the thwarting of His attempts to make Himself completely immanent in the world—which in religious language means His attempt to establish His Kingdom completely. Now it is with the operations of the Holy Spirit that we associate our ideas of immanence. He it is who works in the hearts of men, teaching them and guiding them into all truth. This one Spirit is perfecting the saints and building up the one body of Christ, bringing all into the unity of the faith and forming in each a full-grown man after the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. By such operations of the Spirit the moral and spiritual immanence of God is being increased, and the day of the Kingdom is being fulfilled. But in all these operations the Spirit has to encounter man's sin. He is in some measure thwarted by it. It becomes for Him an ever-present *πειρασμός* to be endured for the sake of the Kingdom. Hence Holy Scripture can speak of the Spirit being "grieved" and "resisted" and "rebelled against" and, still more vividly, as interceding for us with unutterable groanings. This, surely, is to say almost outright that the Spirit suffers and, if there is suffering in God at all, that suffering is endured chiefly and immediately by the Holy Spirit.

But of a piece with this line of thought is the suggestion in Col. i. 24, where St. Paul speaks of filling up "that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ . . . for his body's sake, which is the Church." These afflictions of Christ, says Dr. Maurice Jones,\* are "the sufferings . . . which Christ endures now in His exalted state," and they are sufferings endured, according to St. Paul, "for his body's sake, which is the Church." There are, then, sufferings attributed to the exalted Christ which link on with the sufferings of the sanctifying, immanence-seeking Spirit, and these sufferings have to be fitted within the framework of Trinitarian theology.

If, then, the Son and the Spirit suffer, has the Father any part in their sufferings, or does He stand apart as the sole possessor of impassibility? The Three Divine Persons we believe

\* *Ep. to Col.*, p. 107.



are essentially One, and a part of Trinitarian theology is the doctrine of the mutual permeation and mutual indwelling of the Blessed Three, so that there is in Them but one action, one knowledge, and one will. May we not say, then, that the Father suffers in the sufferings of the Son and Holy Spirit? Did it after all mean nothing to the Father that He "so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son"? May not that fact be some kind of guarantee that the Father had a share in the sufferings of the Incarnate Son, and further, have we not a similar guarantee that He shares always in the sufferings of the Third Person of the Trinity, in the fact that He so loves the world that He gives His Holy Spirit?

Yet, on the other hand, there is a further consideration which arises from the doctrine of the mutual indwelling and permeation of the Three Blessed Persons. If all Three Persons suffer on account of the world's sin, yet the Divine Unity is not divided by this suffering. The suffering of the Spirit does not rend or separate Him from the Father or the Son any more than did the *δεῖ παθεῖν* consciousness of the Son mar the unbroken communion which He had with the Father. May it not be, then, that in this doctrine of coinherence we shall find some understanding of the problem how God can suffer and yet be the fulness of joy? Father, Son, and Holy Spirit suffer, all Three Persons suffer, and hence they are united in a fellowship of suffering which, because it is a fellowship, contains nought that can mar the divine joy and beatitude. We must remember that the sufferings of God, if they exist at all, arise from His contact with the world. They are sufferings directly related to the fact of God's immanence, and it is the immanent God whom we chiefly know. But the same God who is, and always has been, in some degree immanent, who, through the Holy Spirit, is aiming at a complete and final immanence which shall be all in all, this same God is yet the absolute transcendent One who freely willed a creation which is but the overflowing of His own self-originated and self-sufficing life. Here, then, in the transcendent, undivided life of the One in Three we shall doubtless find that ocean of overflowing life and unmixed joy and entire delectation which is the ground of all being and all becoming. May not God as transcendent be all this, and yet, as a Personalist Being immanent in His world and striving to make His immanence in the moral and spiritual realms more complete, experience the suffering engendered by human sin?

Mr. Hartill, in the book already referred to, asks whether we have "any right to assume that the human psychological state which St. Paul describes as being 'sorrowful, yet always rejoicing,' and which seems to be peculiarly manifested by St. Francis



of Assisi, has no counterpart in God." And the answer implied in his question is that we have no such right that such a counterpart may exist. This article has aimed at showing along what lines we may perhaps think of this counterpart. The suffering of which we have spoken arises from no necessity whatever but the law of God's own being. Its direct and immediate cause is man's racial apostasy from God, but even that is only within the limits of freedom allowed by an all-wise and all-loving Creator. It will continue, too, only till the Kingdom shall come, until the absolute transcendent One shall have pressed on His immanence to the point of being all in all. Then, indeed, there will be joy only, joy complete and overflowing, but until that perfect day dawn God, in His Threefold Nature, as once in the life of the Incarnate Son, for the joy that is set before Him endures the cross, despising the shame.

JAMES W. STRATTON.

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## THE CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS\*

### III

My remaining task is the discussion of Canon Quick's criticism on the conception of a physical object as "a complex of persisting opportunities of experience which have a common situation in space." Canon Quick objects in the first place to talking of opportunities having a situation in space. Now I fully admit that the phrase in question is too loose, and I prefer the phrase as amended (as the result of a conversation with Canon Quick) in Professor Taylor's and my paper, and as already quoted: "A physical object is a complex of opportunities of experience including such experience as leads us to assign to the object shape, size, and position." But in the first place, even in its original form, I think the phrase defensible. If someone asks me where they can get a drink, and I reply that the opportunity will be found in the next room, the expression may be loose, but is, on the one hand, a perfectly intelligible statement, and, on the other hand, admits of precise formulation, along the lines of the amended statement, by defining the (instantaneous) situation of a physical object (defined as a complex of opportunities of experience) by reference to the physical experiences, the opportunities for which, at the moment in question, are included in the complex. With the further and complicated problem of relating space and time to physical experiences, or rather of con-

\* The first of this series of articles on Canon Quick's book, *The Christian Sacraments*, appeared in January, and the second in February.



structing space-time out of physical experiences, I am not now concerned save to assert my belief that modern mathematical philosophy is justified alike in holding that this can be done, and in holding that the problem is much more complicated than the ordinary man is disposed to think. What I am concerned to insist is that if such a construction is possible, and affords the only adequate account of space and time, then it is possible to define satisfactorily what one means by the "situation" of an object when an object is defined as I have defined it. Indeed, my own objection to the earlier form of the definition of an object was rather that it failed to state explicitly that the complex must include opportunities for physical experiences (and for physical experiences such as to assign shape, size, and position) with the result that the definition was too wide save by implication of them from the necessity of a "common situation."

Canon Quick makes the further point that an opportunity is essentially a relation. That I would concede, and I would say that in the last analysis, from the point of view of Christian theism, those opportunities which constitute an object are found to be relations of certain classes of sentient subjects to God as the ground of all experience: relations which are sufficiently common or connected for different subjects as to yield a "common world," and which in the case of a particular "object" are so related among themselves, for any subject, as to constitute a complex. For most purposes, however, it is sufficient to regard the relations involved as relations between experiences. This is possible, since the assertion of an opportunity of experience is to be understood as an assertion that, if certain conditions are satisfied, this experience can be secured by any one of a certain class of sentient subjects, and since the conditions in question (which correspond to the phrase "at a particular time at a particular place") can be expressed in terms of actual or possible experiences which, in the main, need not be experiences of the same subject. In view of certain of Canon Quick's criticisms, it should be noted that the relation involved in an "opportunity" is not between experiences, opportunities for which form part of the complex constituting the object in question, but between such an experience and other actual or possible experiences not necessarily of the same sentient subject. The very fact that a "complex" is asserted implies, however, that relations exist also between the experiences, opportunities for which are constituent elements in the complex. Partly these are "perspective" relations between actual or possible experiences "in different positions." Partly they express the fact that certain opportunities of experience involve the existence



of certain other opportunities of experience, or would be destroyed or radically modified if these were modified.

If this all sounds a very complicated way of looking at simple things, I can only reply that the whole tendency of modern scientific philosophy is to insist that, partly but not only through new views of space and time, no simple account is adequate. For justification of that statement I may fairly refer to the works of Professor Whitehead or Mr. Bertrand Russell. I should perhaps explain, however, why I prefer to define a physical object as a complex of opportunities of experience, rather than as a complex of possible experiences or as the class of experiences which in ordinary parlance are called the appearances of the object. My reasons are, first, that this enables us to keep closer to the ordinary conception of an object by making it easier to speak of its existence at a given moment. Secondly, that it copes better with opportunities of experience, the realization of which involves the destruction or radical change of the object—*e.g.*, an opportunity of nutrition. The two views are connected by the definition of the situation of an object by reference to the physical experiences, opportunities for which form part of the complex.

Part of Canon Quick's objection to such a view (*e.g.*, in the last paragraph of his book) seems to me to depend on confusion (due, I suspect, to looseness of expression on my part) between what is involved in the perception of an object and in its existence. An object cannot be perceived without certain of its constituent opportunities of experience being actualized in experience, but in my view it can exist (or subsist) without this being the case. I think, however, that Canon Quick's difficulty does not turn merely on possible misunderstanding, and that he would deny that, being relations, opportunities can be said to exist. In the commonsense meaning of the word "exist," I think they can be said to exist, just as one can talk, for example, of Boyle's discovering the *existence* of the law that the pressure of a gas varies inversely with its volume. But I admit the analogy of a law, and that by the existence of an object one does not mean precisely what one means by the existence, for example, of a person, or indeed even of an experience; and that in consequence, when it is necessary to make the distinction, an object as being a complex of relations might be said (like the laws of natural science) to subsist rather than 'to exist. On the other hand, it is important to make clear that an assertion of an object is not at all completely analogous to the assertion of such laws as Boyle's law, since such a law asserts a relation between experiences, if these exist, without throwing any light on the possibility of the experiences "at a particular time and place."



Further, when a physical object is said to have a particular (instantaneous) situation in the sense already explained, a far more significant statement is made than would be made if we tried to ascribe "situation" to a natural law by reference to experiences to which it applied. This is the case, if for no other reasons, because an object is so defined as to have, in the sense already indicated, only one situation at a given time, whereas no definition of a natural law or of the "situation" of the law would yield this result. It is, of course, also important to emphasize that if it is held that a physical object, defined as I have defined it, that a chair, for example, should be said to subsist rather than to exist, one is not denying those connotations of the word "exist" which make the ordinary man anxious to insist that chairs *exist*. What he is concerned to assert is the certainty, reliability, persistence and givenness of certain opportunities of experience, none of which is in question. To sum up, I cannot see that there is any doubt that opportunities (or any relations) may be said to exist in the ordinary sense of the word: but I recognize that as the meaning of the word is narrowed for certain purposes to apply only to substantial existence, it becomes inapplicable, and it is necessary to assert that objects "subsist."\*

In conclusion, there is one further element in what I take

\* From considerations of space I cannot deal fully with one minor but important criticism made by Canon Quick (p. 256, 257) on a footnote to my essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (p. 443 of the latter), since I could only do so by quoting in full my note and Canon Quick's criticism. It may, however, be worth while to add my reply for anyone who cares to turn up these references. In regard to my illustration and Canon Quick's criticism, the manner in which I expressed myself may have (and, I think, did) lay what was said open to the formal objection taken by him: but I had intended my illustration to make clear by its nature that what I had in mind was *creative* activity. My contention is simply that when it is possible for certain persons (but not inanimate agency) to create out of a physical object or objects a physical object which affords opportunities of experience not previously afforded, the antecedent possibility of the latter object characterizes the persons in question rather than the original object. In other words, an assertion of the pre-existing possibility of the final object is rightly regarded rather as an assertion of a capacity possessed by certain persons, than as a description of a property of the original object, even although this latter is a necessary element.

Canon Quick also suggests that I might have replied in my footnote to the objection with which I was dealing by referring to fundamental considerations, and he suggests reasons why a reply on such lines was not made. I meant my concluding remark in the footnote, that a reply seemed to me to be possible along such lines, and as to my reasons for replying otherwise, to have more significance than Canon Quick gave it. The fuller discussion on Professor Taylor's and my Anglo-Catholic Congress paper of the conception of physical objects and of the considerations which justify Eucharistic adoration (especially p. 115 f.) indicate the lines along which such a reply would be possible. It is the case that there is involved in our Lord's being and nature the possibility, as well as the realization, of means whereby His life may be made immediately appropriable by us; but, so long as in any instance there is only the unactualized possibility, this inheres primarily not in the bread and wine, but in the existence of a ministry empowered to consecrate these to be a Sacrament. There is involved an antecedent presence, but it is simply our Lord's presence in the Church as His Mystical Body; after consecration there is *also* a presence as our Sacrificial Food.



to be Canon Quick's position to which I would wish to refer—namely, a very great distrust of the argument from experience in relation to the sacramental cultus, and a still greater distrust of the defence of such methods of worship by means of any theology other than the theology with which they have been associated in history. The latter point affords a convenient introduction to the former. Canon Quick complains, for once almost with bitterness: "One of the chief perplexities of the whole discussion arises from the fact that the interest of many Anglo-Catholics is so exclusively fixed on the worship, not the doctrine, of Catholicism, that they seem willing to adopt the most apparently unCatholic of doctrines, if only it can be represented as affording ground for the external practice of a Catholic devotion." Canon Quick makes this remark in connection with a particular Eucharistic theology which any member of the school which I am defending would agree with Canon Quick in regarding as quite inadequate to support the traditional Western cultus. But his remark is capable of, and I think was intended to have, a much wider reference. The point which has to be made in reply (beyond prompt objection to the word "external," and deleting this for purposes of argument) is that Canon Quick's perplexity turns on the view taken of the relation between theology and experience; or, if it is preferred, between theology and worship. Anglo-Catholicism of the type in question is definitely empiricist. It holds that the fundamental significance of a doctrine consists in its proved value as a guide to religious experience. It is saved, however, from merely lapsing into pragmatism by holding not that the assertion of such value is equivalent to asserting the truth of a doctrine, but that in so far as doctrines, which have such value in particular directions, fit into a coherent intellectual system, which affords in a unique degree a guide to the whole field, there is reason for believing that the system, as a whole, affords our truest available outlook, and that in so far as particular doctrines afford a guide to religious experience, we are bound to hold that any adequate theology must both account for that success and itself be a no less successful guide.

I am not concerned here and now to discuss or defend such empiricism beyond noting that far better than either rationalism or belief in some infallible oracle, in thus judging of doctrines by their fruits, the attitude in question accords with the teaching of the New Testament, and beyond repeating what must always be said in this connection, that by religious experience is not meant emotional thrills, and that the phrase has primary reference to capacities well-nigh as general as religion, and to the abiding effects of their exercise on character and otherwise. What I am



concerned to insist on is the change of view to which such an attitude leads in regard to the relation of doctrine and experience. It is entirely natural to suspect the defence of a cultus in terms of other than traditional doctrine, if doctrine is regarded primarily as something which is excogitated by philosophy, or is based directly on certain propositions guaranteed by an infallible oracle. On an empirical basis such suspicion becomes just as meaningless as would be hesitation to take advantage of the facts of gravity on the ground that Newtonian physics was regarded as inadequate, and that these facts were now being co-ordinated by a quite new and far more complicated theory.

On the other hand, I do believe that the argument from experience in favour of the cultus of the sacrament requires far more careful statement than it ordinarily receives, and I think that what I have in mind in this connection goes some way to meet Canon Quick's instinctive suspicion. I need hardly repeat that the argument cannot be based on emotional thrills. Nor can it be based on the fact that certain temperaments find it far easier to worship if they can conceive the God who is the object of worship as in some way embodied. That is true even of idolatry; and the most which can be said is that the facts of idolatry go far to justify the statement just made, and to suggest that in a final religion assistance might prove to have been given to these types, along some lines which were free from the evils of idolatry. The argument for the cultus from experience is confined to very necessary rebuttals, or is primarily indirect, although not, in consequence, any less impressive. As regards rebuttals, there is, of course, a direct appeal to experience, when it is alleged by less fair-minded critics than Canon Quick that the cultus leads to infrequent communion or to depreciation of purely spiritual (mental) prayer. It is quite intolerable that such charges should be bandied about, because it is felt that the cultus ought to have these results, or even because it has these results in its corrupter forms, when the facts are that, in other circumstances, it goes along with exceptionally frequent communion and unusual insistence on the importance of meditation. It is, in fact, just in connection with meditation that a strong indirect argument arises. It is not only that sacramental adoration, in common with almost any practice of adoration, is found to benefit the religious life; or that for certain types this form of adoration is much easier than most others. It is apparently the case that many experts in mental prayer, of very varied types, have found it no more difficult to approach God in such prayer, because their idea of God involved the cultus in question; that in very many cases this has been felt to be not a



hindrance, but a real assistance in such prayer;\* and that when the cultus and sacramental religion in general have been felt to create a difficulty, it has always been either because it has been regarded as intellectually inconsistent with the conception of God as a Spirit to be approached in spirit, or because its rejection has been found to throw into relief this truth. As regards the first of these objections, it is simply a question of the truth or otherwise of the judgment involved. As regards the second, it is a commonplace of the history of religion that jettisoning all but certain truths does so throw these into relief and stimulate their use as to produce benefit in the first generation or two, and for certain types. The trouble comes later when novelty no longer gives special vitality, and through the fact that the children of those concerned do not necessarily conform to the types in question. The evidence would seem to support the conclusion, not that the cultus assists all types, but that it does definitely assist certain types, including types which are by no means inferior intellectually or spiritually, and that such assistance is not occasional or merely emotional, but runs through their whole religious life. In so far as this is the case, there is evidence for its legitimacy.

WILL SPENS.

## CONSCIENCE

*What is meant by conscience?*—Etymologically *conscientia* and *συνείδησις* mean the knowledge a man has with some other. (1) According to Trench it is the knowledge a man has

\* In this immediate connection Canon Quick's objection has special force, since the "idea of God" is bound up not only with the practice but with the theology of the cultus; and since argument from Catholic experience is therefore argument from experience in which this theology mattered not merely as encouraging the practice but in its more general reactions. The position is, I think, as follows. The "idea of God," as effective in meditation, is determined by the general implications of the theology rather than by the exact form of the intellectual construction. I should be very sorry to argue from the traditional experience to a theology so different from the traditional theology as, for example, one which gave the Host simply a significance comparable to that of a crucifix. It is another matter when the difference of theology is really in the field of philosophy, so that it may be said that if the new theology had to be stated in terms of scholasticism the traditional theology or something very like it would result. It would be argued, of course on behalf of the new theology, that by taking advantage of an improved philosophy it was able to effect a more satisfactory synthesis than was previously possible and to outflank difficulties which the scholastic philosophy did not afford the means to outflank. I think it was Philaret who said, in substance, that Westerns could only think of a real presence materialistically; and therefore, that those who were most sure of the presence were bound to say that it was materialistic, and those who were most sure that it could not be materialistic were bound to deny its existence. Substituting "quasi-materialistically," I would accept a parallel phrase as applicable to the position until recent philosophy afforded new lines of attack. I have in mind not only work on the philosophy of objects, but new emphasis on the symbolic character of any intellectual construction.



with *God*. "That other knower is God, who makes His law and His presence felt in the heart." Accordingly conscience has been called "the oracle of God," "God's vicegerent in the soul," "the inner light." Wordsworth calls it "God's most intimate presence in the soul." Conscience says "I ought"—*i.e.*, I owe it to One whose voice I hear and who has a claim on my obedience. (2) According to Cremer it is the knowledge one has with *oneself*, one's own consciousness, what one knows by oneself. This roughly corresponds with *intuition*, and with the Saxon *inwit*. "Know thyself" (*γνῶθι σεαυτόν*) was a familiar maxim among the Stoics, and conscience is a term borrowed from their philosophy. "Stoic philosophy," says Lightfoot, "had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilized world at the time of the Christian era." (3) According to many modern writers it is the knowledge one has with *other men*. The individual conscience, it is said, is a reflection of the tribal customs or social laws of the community to which the man belongs. We are largely influenced by environment and "atmosphere." Things are considered right or wrong according to the general perception of the age in which we live and the community in which we dwell. As the intelligence and moral faculties of the age and the community develop, so will conscience also develop. "Human evolution is divine education," it is said. When the community has come under the influence of the greatest of teachers, Jesus Christ, conscience attains its highest development.

But whatever the word was originally intended to denote, all will agree that conscience is the innate capacity which we possess that enables us to discern what is good, appreciate what is true, and recognize what is right. Conscience is primarily the intuitive faculty of moral judgment. It bears witness to the divine law written in the human heart, and produces the feeling of approbation or condemnation in regard to our actions. "Conscience," says Newman, "implies a relation between the soul and something exterior and superior to itself, a relation to a tribunal over which it has no power. The more closely this inward monitor is followed, the clearer its dictates become. It is something more than a moral sense, for it implies the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed. It implies that there is One to whom we are responsible. On doing wrong we feel the same broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother. On doing right we enjoy the same satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father."

*Conscience in the Bible.*—When we turn to the Bible we find that the word (though not the idea) is entirely absent from



the canonical books of the Old Testament. "My *heart* shall not reproach me," says Job (xxvii. 6) where we should be inclined to say "my *conscience*." In the New Testament we find the same thought expressed in the same way by St. John: "If our heart condemn us not" (1 Eph. iii. 21). To the Jew the heart was the organ of spiritual intuition, and he did not attempt to make psychological distinctions. The LXX uses *συνείδησις* twice, but only once is it rendered "conscience" in our English Bible (Wisd. xvii. 11). So far as we know, the word was never used by our Lord. In the A.V. it occurs once in the Gospels (John viii. 9), but the clause is omitted in the R.V. It occurs twice in the addresses of St. Paul recorded in Acts, plentifully in the epistles of St. Paul and St. Peter, and in the epistle to the Hebrews. In all these places its force is equivalent to that which it still bears in modern speech.

*Conscience must be educated.*—Conscience is educable and must be instructed. An ignorant man may do wrong conscientiously. "It is certain," says Dr. Dale, "that however earnestly a man may mean to do well, he will do very badly if his conscience is uninstructed." In teaching there is usually a textbook, and the textbook of conscience is the Bible. Creeds and catechisms have their use, but their ultimate authority is the Scriptures. It is the office of the Church to interpret the Bible, and through preaching the gospel to awaken the conscience and lead men to repentance. Sin hardens the heart and poisons the will: it puts the conscience to sleep, like a narcotic, and the gospel is the antidote.

*Conscience must be exercised.*—Like every other natural faculty, the conscience needs training. A faculty can only be developed by practice. You can never by lecturing instruct anyone in arithmetic; the explanations will be useless unless they are put into practice. The Bible is our textbook, but its precepts must be put into practice. We sometimes hear of "the Nonconformist conscience," and it is said that there is a higher standard of morality amongst Unitarians than amongst Christians: if this is true it is because the Unitarian makes better use of his conscience than the Christian. A faculty that is not kept in use tends to lose its power and become useless.

*Conscience must be enlightened.*—An unenlightened conscience is a dangerous thing. The mind of man needs not only the light of nature but also the light of God, the inspiration and illumination of the Holy Spirit. "It is a perilous error," says Bishop Gore, "to say that we have only to follow our conscience; we have to enlighten it and keep it enlightened." "No man," says Dr. Garvie, "should be so confident of his own



moral or religious discernment as to refuse any fresh instruction or illumination which may come to him. Humility and sincerity are the conditions of preserving a good conscience."

*Conscience must be kept clean.*—"See that you have a clean conscience," says St. Peter (1 Eph. iii. 16: Moffatt's translation): conscience must be purified by God's grace and kept undefiled. In the Shinto temples of Japan there is always a mirror, and this emblem mutely exhorts men to look into their hearts and see if they are as clean as they should be. The mirror is of brass or other metal (as all mirrors used to be) and it needs constant polishing. Like a watch, conscience must be kept clean or it will not work properly. Like a looking-glass or like spectacles, a breath will sometimes make it dim. The distinction between good and evil easily becomes obscured.

*Conscience must be kept tender.*—St. Paul speaks of false teachers whose consciences were seared as with a hot iron (1 Tim. iv. 2). When the skin is burnt it is less susceptible to impressions, for the nerves are dulled or destroyed. The conscience must be guarded from everything that will deaden or harden it. Like a sword, its edge may be blunted; like a compass, it may be deflected.

*Conscience must be examined.*—The Church bids us examine our conscience by the rule of God's commandments. We should try to see ourselves as others see us and as God sees us. Self-examination has been practised by devout men in all ages. It has not been confined to Christians; both Jews and pagans have experienced its value. Seneca said that every night, after his lamp was out and the house quiet, he went over the past day and looked at it in the light of eternity. Marcus Aurelius advocated daily self-examination.

*Conscience needs to be inspired.*—The mind must be awakened to perceive the beauty and excellence of goodness. The good teacher infects his pupils with a love of the subject he is teaching. An art student may be able to draw well and may know all about the technique of painting, but he will not be able to paint a good picture till he has come under the influence of some great artist. In philosophy, science, and literature, disciples catch the spirit of their master. Great soldiers and sailors have inspired thousands of men with courage and devotion. But no one has so inspired men as Christ did, and He inspires His followers to-day as He inspired them nineteen centuries ago. True Christians are those who have caught the spirit of the Master. "Anyone who does not possess the Spirit of Christ does not belong to Him" (Rom. viii. 9: Moffatt's translation).

Conscience is authoritative but not infallible, any more than reason is infallible. What is right to the individual may not be



right in itself. Conscience tells us that right is to be followed, but it does not infallibly tell us what is right. A conscientious man is not one who necessarily does what is right, but one who does what he believes to be right. The inner light is not always a sufficient guide in human conduct. It is often assumed that a man has only to follow his conscience and he will be in the right way, but this is not always the case. We are not endowed with a moral ready-reckoner which gives the solution to every problem. The Spartan mother conscientiously exposed her sickly or deformed child. The Hindu mother throws her fairest child into the Ganges as an offering to the gods. St. Paul as a Jew had bitterly persecuted the Christian Church, and had done so conscientiously. Conscience may mislead men: some of the most wicked and cruel things done in the world have been done conscientiously.

*Freedom of conscience.*—The freedom of conscience is a very practical question to the Church and the State. Many devout clergymen were driven out of the Church of England in 1662 by the Act of Uniformity: was the Church wrong? Pious Quakers are excluded from Christian privileges; is it right? The Mormon believes that polygamy is right; is the United States Government wrong in forbidding the practice? The pacifist believes it is wrong to fight in any circumstances; ought the state to exempt him? Here it may be argued that in the one case the morality is retrogressive, a return to a lower social stage, and therefore cannot be tolerated, and that the ethical code of the other is premature and too ideal for present conditions. But the question of the toleration of conscientious objectors remains the same: neither the State nor the Church recognizes the infallibility of conscience.

We are bound to respect the man who says, "I will not lose my conscience to save my life," and we must remember that the martyrs and confessors of the Church and many of the reformers and heroes of the State suffered because they were men of stronger fibre and greater spiritual discernment than their fellows. Their conscience had developed beyond the normal stage reached by the age in which they lived or the society to which they belonged.

*The final tribunal.*—Is conscience the supreme authority? Yes and no. There is still the old paradox: *to act against one's conscience is always wrong, but to act according to one's conscience is not always right.* "Only by a light that is not of this world can we surely see our way about this world": yet the light comes through our eyes, and they cannot always be depended on. Two men may have different ocular impressions of the same thing; both cannot be right, and both may possibly be wrong.



Some eyes are more powerful than others, and all need training: but even the sight of an expert observer may sometimes be deceived. Nevertheless we must use our eyes, even though they sometimes deceive us. A man who follows his conscience may be dangerous, but the man who ignores his conscience is more dangerous. A man's conscience is his court of appeal, for what a man deems right, that he also conceives God to approve of. Yet St. Paul (who had studied the subject very deeply and who had suffered much as a "conscientious objector" to Judaism) appeals to a higher court than conscience. "I am not conscious of any dereliction of duty, it is true: still, I do not on that account claim to be exonerated of blame. But I do say that the only one who has a right to judge me is the Lord" (1 Cor. iv. 4, Way's translation).

*Casuistry.*—Sometimes the dictates of conscience seem to conflict, the same finger-post seems to point in different directions, opposite lines of action appear to be equally right or wrong: hence comes casuistry, the science of resolving cases of conscience. Casuistry may be defined as the application of general ethical principles to particular cases of conduct. We cannot here deal with this important subject, but a remark of Bishop Collins is very suggestive: "If two duties have to be faced, the harder one will almost invariably prove to be the right one to follow."

"*The Inner House.*"—St. Bernard treats of conscience in his *De Interiori Domo*. "The Inner House" is conscience, and he conceives it as supported upon seven pillars. (1) A good will (*bona voluntas*)—the will to do good. (2) Memory (*memoria*)—the remembrance of God's benefits. (3) A clean heart (*cor mundum*)—the heart must be kept pure. (4) A free mind (*animus liber*)—a mind disengaged from worldly thoughts and cares. (5) A right spirit (*spiritus rectus*)—a spirit turned away from earthly things and directed towards God. (6) A devout soul (*mens devota*)—a mind consecrated to God. (7) An enlightened reason (*ratio illuminata*)—for conscience needs illumination.

*The peace of conscience.*—Nothing can give a man greater peace than a quiet conscience. Shakespeare said:

I feel within me  
A peace above all earthly dignities,  
A still and quiet conscience.

"Have a good conscience, and thou shalt ever have joy," says the *Imitatio*. "The torture of a bad conscience is the hell of a living soul," said Calvin.

A man should listen to the voice of conscience, not try to stifle it, and should act according to its dictates. But he must



also remember that his conscience is no more infallible than his watch. Keep your watch in good order, set it by the sun or by standard time, and then follow it. Keep your conscience right, too, and follow it. "Keep innocency, and take heed unto the thing that is right: for that shall bring a man peace at the last" (Ps. xxxvii. 38, P.B. version). "It is my earnest endeavour," says St. Paul, "always to have a clear conscience in relation to God and man" (Acts xxiv. 16—Weymouth's translation). Let the apostle's endeavour be our own. J. S. BADCOCK.

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## THE NEW PROSPECT IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

### I

THE title of this paper is meant to carry an allusion to the recent Board of Education Pamphlet, No. 60. This pamphlet, as it explains in a prefatory note, was prepared in the hope that it might assist towards the solution of problems of organization in connection with the provision of proper educational facilities for older children. In other words, it is concerned with the now generally known Hadow Report. This Report is the accepted basis of all proposals for the reorganization of our schools, and although its findings are not yet legally binding upon every local education authority, yet its main principles are already being applied widely and their universal application seems to be only a matter of a comparatively short time. The main thesis of the report is the provision for every child over the age of eleven (11+ is used to denote the beginning of this period) of a system of intermediate or post-primary education. To achieve this purpose every child will have experience of two quite different types of school—a Junior school from about the age of 7+ to about the age of 11+ (following, of course, a previous period in an infant department) and a Senior school from 11+ to 14 or 15. These latter schools will be of more than one type, but in every case will be sharply differentiated from the Junior schools. Nor will transference to them be voluntary or depend, except as to choice as between one type of Senior school and another, upon achievement, but solely and strictly upon age. The application of these principles is already leading to a vast reorganization of our day schools, but it is not merely as a measure of organization from the point of view of administrative convenience that the Ministry is regard-



ing the matter, but in the light of a new vision of what the education of our children, and especially of the adolescents, may be.

That the Hadow Report raises questions of the first importance for those concerned with religious education is self-evident, and eventually the policy which is to be followed in the educational system of the country in consequence of it must have far-reaching results upon the action of the Church. This paper, however, is only concerned with one aspect of the matter—namely, the effect which the new policy may have upon those occasions and means of religious education which the Church furnishes outside the limits of statutory school hours. No policy with regard to religious education is complete which fails to recognize the important, and even decisive, place which belongs to such efforts. In the past, it is probably true to say, the part played by our Sunday schools (using the term widely to include all efforts to give education in religion other than in day school) has not been given enough serious attention. It is widely conceded that no training in religion is complete which does not lead its possessor to recognize his place in the worship of the Church and in its life of social service. Herein has lain the importance of all that for which the Church has contended in the effort to maintain the work of her schools. For the Church, religious education does not mean a certain degree of acquaintanceship with religious literature, nor the acceptance of a moral outlook in conformity with Christian principles, or even an individual relationship to God. Our conception has rather been that to be educated as a Christian implies nurture as a member of the Christian body resulting in the realization of satisfactory membership in the Church. Thus, characteristically, the standard which has been raised has always been that of the Catechism, with its emphasis upon membership in the body, with its insistence upon worship as part of the first and greatest duty, with its assumption that Christ hath ordained a Church and Sacraments which are “generally necessary.” The refusal to be put off with “plain Bible teaching” has meant vastly more than an obstinate sectarianism; it has meant that we hold religious education to imply training in Churchmanship, in active membership of the body of Christ, as an integral part. From the outset it is clear that part of such an education will, under any circumstances, have to take place under other conditions than those of day school: the parish priest, however well served by his day school, will need to supplement it with further means of training in worship and prayer and of individual training of young Communicants. Wherever there exists a Church day school there exists potentially an instrument



of remarkable value for the realization of this ideal of religious education, and thus it is that all that has been or can be done to maintain such schools is of the highest importance, provided that by "maintain" we mean "maintain the use of" and not merely "maintain the bare possession of."

But it has to be realized that already more than half the children of the country are being educated in undenominational schools. The effect of the Hadow Report will, whatever may be the policy of the Church with regard to the provision of some Church central schools, quite certainly be to increase, and that to a very considerable extent, the proportion of children in undenominational schools. The Church, whatever policy she adopts, will soon be in the position of having a distinct minority of the elementary school children in her schools, and only a small fraction of the post-primary children.

It is with such reflections that we come to consider the new prospect for religious education. We find the key to the problem in the question—does the Church still adhere to her belief as to what constitutes real religious education, that is as to the necessity for nurture in membership of the Christian body? If the answer to this be, as we suppose, in the affirmative, then we begin to see, in spite of much that is confusing, one or two clear points. Of these the most clear is that whatever else may be done—and there are other sides to this whole subject which we gladly leave to those who have more authority with regard to them—there is an urgent need of a fresh evaluation of those means of religious education which take place in other than school hours. It is something of a reproach to us that the term "religious education" almost always is taken to mean day school religious education. It is a reproach because it indicates a strange lack of appreciation of the actual situation. We need not undervalue what is done in the day school, as is too often done, in order to appreciate that very much is not, nor can be, done there. About the day schools both now and in the future it is impossible to generalize; the conditions are not and will not be uniform. But one sweeping generalization is possible about the Church's religious education of her children, and it is this—that only where there exists a supplementary agency for religious education, working, it is to be hoped, in perfect accord with the day schools, whether provided or non-provided, can the Church's educational ideal be fulfilled today and still more in the future. It will be the function of this supplementary agency to be the link between school and Church, to bring the religious teaching of the day school into that special focus and expression which it is impossible wholly to obtain through the day school alone, even when the day school is a



Church school. To procure the existence of such an agency in every parish is, we submit, the most obvious and urgent duty in the policy of the Church. It involves taking, with far greater decision than at present, steps to ensure that every man ordained to the ministry of the Church is capable of leading this educational work in the parish: it involves further that the equipment of every parish with a Sunday school, or its equivalent, that is an educationally sound instrument, should be as great a preoccupation of the Church as the maintenance of the fabric of its day school buildings has been in the past. Nor need this appear a fantastic suggestion: with all the obvious imperfections of our present Sunday schools it is doubtless true that already more than half of the specifically Church religious education which occurs at all today, occurs through the Sunday schools—building, let us hasten to add, on the admirable foundation of scriptural knowledge usually acquired in the day school. Further, all too few people realize what admirable instruments for a special kind of education these schools can be when anything like real and persistent care and effort is put into them and into the training of their teachers.

This, then, is our first point with regard to the effect of the Hadow Report on the prospect for religious education—namely, that it indicates the prime necessity of bending our efforts to set up a more efficient “Sunday school” system. We have used the term “Sunday school” in the absence of any other available one. Actually the agency of which we speak need not be a school, nor need it, necessarily, meet on Sunday. It might, for example, be an adolescent fellowship, or a catechism, or a class meeting on a weekday: certainly it would always have a threefold strand of activity which consisted of worship, instruction, and social life, seeing that it exists to educate its members in the meaning of Churchmanship.

We are not particularly sanguine of success in putting forward this view, but we are very much in earnest. Doubtless for every sound educational reason the Church must continue to be deeply interested not only in her own day schools, but in all the day schools of the land, for there can be no true education of any kind which is not fundamentally religious. This consideration, alone, would justify a strong policy in favour of maintaining our training colleges and, so far as may be, our schools. But the contention deliberately put forward here is that, from the Church’s point of view, religious education means something more than this: that this “something more” represents precisely that thing for which the Church has been and still is and must be contending: that it is impossible to achieve it without adequate Sunday schools, whereas even now



it has perforce in the case of more than half the children of the country to be achieved, or attempted, without Church day schools.

## II

But it is not only upon our estimate of its value and importance but upon the "Sunday school" itself that the new order in day schools must have its effect. The reorganization of the day schools gives great opportunity for carrying out certain broad reforms right through our Sunday school system. In the first place here is the chance to achieve a single and intelligible nomenclature for grades. At present all is confusion—what one calls a "Primary" department, another calls "Junior," and neither of them means what a nonconformist would mean by the same term: and so it is with "Middle," "Intermediate," and "Senior"; no consistent usage is discernible. Nor does the matter end here; the divergence extends to the actual grading as well as to the names of the grades. One leader will advocate a grade of 8 to 11 years, another a grade of 9 to 13, another 11 to 14. The result is pandemonium as far as the use and provision of teaching material is concerned: a parish priest, misled by the name of the grade on the cover of a lesson book, prescribes for use with his children of 9 what was meant for children of 12. Let us be wise and take this opportunity of getting our grading parallel to the day schools. We shall then have three departments: Infants up to 7, Junior 7+ to 11, Senior 11+ to 15. The gain of keeping in step with day schools will be immense: children who have been graded together on weekdays grade well together on Sundays and *vice versa*. Wherever we can achieve it, our grades should be further subdivided as far, at any rate, as the lesson is concerned. Thus the Infant department will have a beginners' section, and the Junior school will have at least two different editions of the lesson.

We can now, in the spirit of the Hadow Report, concentrate our attention upon our Senior schools. It will not be enough to have separated the 11+ children from the Junior school: we have, further, the task of creating a Senior school which is adequate to the spiritual and intellectual needs of these post-primary children. We shall have to face certain difficulties which the day school escapes. For example we shall not be able, except in rare cases, to provide more than one type of Senior school in any one parish, nor can we gather together children from many different parishes so as to form one strong Central Senior school after the pattern of the weekday Central school. In a few favoured cases both of these difficulties



may be surmountable, but generally the size and resources of our parishes will make it difficult enough to secure a single Senior school distinct from the Junior school.

The intellectual need of this Senior department must be our next consideration, and eventually this consideration may decide the type of the school. At present we hardly at all provide any intellectual food adequate to the needs of these 11 + to 15 children. As has been said, the general complaint is that they drop off for the most part long before they are 15—the fact is that whether they so leave the school or not we cease to be educating them long before: we have hardly any real Senior grade work going on in our Sunday schools, and this because we have hardly any teachers fit to give it. If a lesson book is produced really up to the mental capacity of the Senior school, the verdict upon it is, very generally, that it is too difficult; and so it is—too difficult, that is to say, for the teachers. It is much more in their lack of grip of the subject-matter than in their deficiencies with regard to method (for these are much more easily made good) that our Senior school (or, as at present they are often called, "Middle school") teachers fail us. Here, then, is our problem. If we do not set a high enough standard in this Senior school we shall fail to hold the adolescents who are receiving post-primary education on week-days; further we shall fail to deal with them at a crucial point in their religious education, the years round Confirmation and the beginning of Communicant life. The reason of the widely admitted and deplored ignorance of Churchpeople is the absence of educationally sound Senior Sunday schools: just at the time when synthesis and focussing of ideas should have taken place, either nothing happened, or a feeble continuation of Junior work was attempted. But if, on the other hand, we do try to raise the level of the work done in the Senior school, then we are faced with the extraordinary difficulty of finding the teachers. It is at this point that the present writer desires to express a strong opinion that for a long time to come, at any rate, we shall do well to aim at a type of Senior school which rests chiefly on the teaching of one good teacher helped, for the purposes of gaining subsequent class work, by assistants.

It will be so much more possible to secure one person with sufficient knowledge and skill for the task than many, and although the method is not ideal, it is far better than the attempt to give Junior work to Senior children. Many readers will recognize in the adolescent fellowship the type of school which we have here in mind.

The provision of adequate Senior Sunday schools, therefore, is, in the view of the present writer, one of the outstanding



necessities of the new position created for the Church by the adoption of the Hadow Report. A great deal of attention needs to be given, in consequence, to the development along sound lines of such schools. It may be that some rather drastic revision of the method of the Catechism, so as to bring it into line with modern educational practice, will help to solve the problem in some cases. In other cases the method known as the "fellowship," with its combination of the work of the teacher and of group leaders, offers prospect of success. But in any case intelligent study of the methods of the new weekday Senior schools, and careful appreciation of the intellectual standard attained in them, is much to be desired.

It must be realized that the existence of a corresponding grading in weekday schools will do much to stabilize the future Senior Sunday school. Hitherto the fact that boys and girls have left school for work at 13 years of age has had very much to do with their tendency to leave Sunday school at the same age: the suggestion of "leaving" is, after all, a very strong one, and the "shrinkage" of our Sunday schools at this point is not so mysterious as is often assumed. When the Senior school on Sunday corresponds to that on weekday the direction of this "suggestion" will be exactly reversed.

There remains the difficult problem of supplying competent teachers for Senior schools, and this points to the last feature of the present outlook to which we have space to allude. Only if adult religious education is proceeded with in the way suggested, for example, by the Teaching Church Group,\* will the Church be able to buy up the present opportunity. The Senior school requires a new type of teacher better equipped for this particular task. What is lacking at present is not so much the will as the competence for the task. If we invite men and women, whose own knowledge of the subject-matter which ought to be taught is thin or not existent, to teach in Senior schools, we ought not to be surprised at their reluctance to comply. But with an increasing number of keen tutorial classes there ought to be, and surely will be, an increasing number of such teachers. It can at least be claimed that present experience encourages this hope.

Here, then, we must leave the matter. The new prospect for religious education is one in which the Sunday school (in a wide sense) must play a larger part; it is further one which demands the building up of Senior schools on a new level of educational efficiency.

A. R. BROWNE WILKINSON.

\* *The Teaching Church.* A Handbook of Adult Religious Education. S.P.C.K. 1925.



## MISCELLANEA

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

WE have received a copy of a little collection of twenty-six hymns composed, mostly between 1880 and 1883, by Lieut.-Col. W. H. Turton, D.S.O., late R.E. They include the well-known Eucharistic hymn, "O Thou, who at Thy Eucharist didst pray"; while several others of them have found their way into various hymn-books. It is a charming little collection.

We have received from Mrs. Bucknill the following account which a Japanese girl gave of her grandmother, who became a Christian at the age of seventy-five:

She had been a very devout Buddhist, and was troubled by her family becoming Christian, and used to get very annoyed with them when they worried her about Christianity. She had the Buddhist and Shinto shrines, and spent much time tending them.

Then one day she went out alone and met with some kind of accident, and was brought home with her head bandaged and a damaged eye, repeating, "I have seen Jesus." From that moment she put away her shrines, at first turning them face to the wall, but eventually turning them out altogether, and spent her whole time on her knees before a picture of our Lord in Gethsemane, praying and praying. She carried her Bible and Prayer Book in the ceremonial fashion, and everyone had to get out of her way if she had them, as she was carrying "Jesus' Law." Eventually she died, after being unconscious for three days, with one lucid interval at the moment of her last Communion. Her death practically converted her son—that and the behaviour of the Christians during the earthquake.

According to the flesh, what had happened to her was a fall, after which a little Christian boy had gone to her and helped her, and taken her to his home, where she had been cared for and brought home. But in some way through that child she saw a vision.

### NOTES

#### 1. THE AGAPE

So little notice has been taken in England of K. Völker's important book *Mysterium und Agape* (Gotha, 1927) that a belated notice may be useful. For the sake of brevity we will confine ourselves to his theory of the Agape, neglecting much else of value. The outstanding feature of the theory is the rejection of all early testimony to a social meal held in connection with the Eucharist. The chief passages relied on in the ordinary view are as follows:

(a) Acts ii. 42, 46; vi. 2. In ii. 42, "they continued stedfastly in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers," the third item is clearly religious; it denotes a solemn, symbolical partaking of food, not a satisfying meal, which indeed on practical grounds is most



unlikely in view of the large number of adherents. Quite possibly there are three constituent parts, not four, "the breaking of bread" being explanatory of "fellowship." In ii. 46 the prayers in the temple are contrasted with "breaking bread at home." In the light of subsequent practice, Acts xx. 7, the *Didache*, Justin, etc., this is most naturally taken of a Sunday meeting in *one* place, expressing the unity of the Church, for the purpose of a symbolic Eucharistic meal, which would not exclude weekday meetings for the same purpose in private houses. In vi. 2 we read of certain officers appointed to "serve tables," with special reference to the needs of Hellenistic widows. No doubt this refers to one section of the charitable relief pre-eminently developed in the Church of Jerusalem; but there is no hint that it was connected with the official "breaking of the bread."

(b) 1 Cor. xi. 17 ff. is explained thus. A common meal for satisfying hunger presented great difficulties. The ordinary food of the poorest would not satisfy the well-to-do; to provide for all the food of the latter would be financially impossible. But an abuse has grown up which makes a "dominical supper" impossible. Individuals bring their own food with which to satisfy hunger. The rich come early and in effect "picnic"; the poor come when their work is done. The symbolical bread and wine are shared, but no more. The abuse is sternly rebuked. "When ye come together to eat (*i.e.* to celebrate the Lord's Supper), wait one for another"; satisfy hunger at home. Here again we look in vain for a common satisfying meal.

(c) Ignatius, *Trall.* ii. 3: "the deacons are not deacons of foods and drinks, but ministers of the Church of God." Ignatius protests against the view that food and drink were a main preoccupation of the deacons. As part of their work for the poor they were concerned with food questions, but if the Agape were really part of the cult Ignatius would not have written thus.

(d) Justin (1 *Apol.* xiii. 1, xiv. 3, lxvii. 1) merely refers to the charitable activities of the Church.

(e) Pliny to Trajan: "rursusque coeundi ad capiendum cibum promiscuum tamen et innoxium." We must not expect accurate descriptions from Pliny, who merely wishes to clear the Christians from the charge of Thyestean banquets. To what reality does this picture correspond, of believers assembling before sunrise on Sunday morning to sing hymns to Christ as God and bind themselves by a *sacramentum* not to commit serious crimes, dispersing to meet again at night for a common meal? The first part of the account is an impossible description of the Eucharist. Apparently it is a distorted version of Baptism, in which case the evening gathering is the Eucharist.

(f) *Didache* x. 1: "after ye are filled" is said to imply that the feeding of ix. is a satisfying meal, the Jewish prayers of thanksgiving over food supporting the view. But all is spiritualized. The contrast is clear between the Jewish food of the body and the Christian food of the soul (see x. 3).

This is enough for our purpose, since the other passages discussed are later. While we shall probably recognize the cogency of Völker's arguments in the main, he seems to be trying to prove too much. In the nature of things arrangements for meals in the unorganized primitive period must have varied considerably and it is *a priori* probable that there were some early precedents for the later (if we accept Völker's view) Agape, and that they were in places associated with the Eucharist.

The Agape is described by Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria



and in the Church Orders, so by the end of the second century it was firmly established. It was a regular, satisfying meal, not primarily designed to succour poverty. Tertullian's silence as to the association of Agape and Eucharist is significant; for him they are clearly distinct. The Church Orders mention four kinds of meals—the Agape proper, meals for the poor on Sunday, a meal for widows, and the commemoration of the dead. The last (*ἀνάμνησις pro iis, qui defuncti sunt*) is expressly connected with the Eucharist (*primum antequam consideant, mysterium sumant*) and is distinct from the Agape proper. Völker summarizes the evidence for Agapes thus: (1) They were arranged by well-to-do persons in private houses to benefit others; (2) their purpose was social intercourse, charitable help, and edification, the second object gaining at the expense of the other two; (3) there was no obligation to undertake the provision of Agapes; (4) the meal was brought into connection with Church life in that catechumens were excluded and the blessing of the bread (saying grace) was spoken by a cleric only.

The origin of the Agape must be separated from the Eucharist. Luke xiv. 13 f.: "When thou makest a feast . . ." may be assumed to be the text from which it began, as indeed Clement and the Apostolic Constitutions assert. Jewish rather than pagan antecedents are to be sought. St. Paul's clear line of distinction between meals in honour of demons and the Christian Feast (1 Cor. x. 21) must have been applicable to the Agape. Völker finds the actual origin of the Agape as a regular Church institution in the Gnostic practice of sacred meals. The line dividing the great Church and Gnosticism in the period 160-200 was fluctuating, and a Gnostic practice so attractive to the masses will have easily entered. The Church authorities directed the movement into harmless channels of charitable activity. In the fourth century conditions changed and the Agape began to die out. One potent cause for its desuetude was the building of fine churches, clearly unsuitable for meals, in the place of the earlier halls.

W. K. L. C.

## 2. A MANUAL FOR GOOD FRIDAY

The S.P.C.K. have recently published a volume entitled *Good Friday: A Manual for the Clergy*. Paper 2s. 6d, cloth 4s.

To read this book is to wonder that it has never been compiled before. It is edited by the Publishers' Editorial Secretary, Dr. Lowther Clarke, and the contributors are expert in their different lines. Good Friday forms of Service for Infants, Children, Public School Boys, Parish Church congregations, and processions of witness; special prayers, hymns and music, Passion Plays, the Three Hours' Devotion—these are some of the subjects treated. Outlines of addresses and sermon-subjects are liberally suggested. If some parts of the book are not quite as good as others, the whole is so good that it would be ungrateful to detail inadequacies.

To the overworked parish priest who yet wants to fill Good Friday with deep meaning for his people, this book will bring fresh ideas full of encouragement; the reader who has lost or never had a vision of the uses of this day should be stimulated out of his rut. It is vain to bemoan the increasing secularization of Good Friday unless the Church provides a genuinely religious alternative. Here we have it, with a width of choice in form and matter which should satisfy most "schools of thought."



The resources of scholarship have been used, and these parts of the book are too much compressed. On the other hand, it is useful to have the results of research even in a condensed form, and it is a great advantage that what may be called, by comparison, the more practical parts are marked by a welcome economy of words. The result is a short book, easily read and easy to refer to.

T. W. PYM.

## VERSE

TRANSLATED FROM FRAY LUIS DE LEÓN, BY REV. W. S. PORTER.

[Luis Ponce de León was born in 1528, probably at Belmonte in La Mancha. In his sixteenth year he was professed in the Augustinian monastery at Salamanca, and at thirty-three became Professor of Scholastic Theology in the university of the same city. In 1570 he was formally denounced to the Inquisition because of certain opinions he had expressed about marriage. The denunciation had no immediate consequences, but two years later the inquisitors of Valladolid succeeded in putting him in prison for four years, on the charge of having translated the Song of Songs into the vulgar tongue. He had indeed done so, but the version was meant for a nun of his acquaintance and not for publication. During his imprisonment he wrote the prose work on *The Names of Christ* and *The Ode to the Virgin*. In 1576 he was released, and returned to his teaching; the opening remark of his first lecture has become famous: "We were saying yesterday. . . ." He died August 23, 1591.

The principal prose works of Luis de León—apart from numerous commentaries and theological treatises in Latin—are *The Names of Christ*, *The Exposition of the Book of Job*, *The Perfect Marriage*, and the translation of the Canticles. The bulk of his poetry is made up of translations from Virgil, Horace, and the Psalms; but the best of it is the odes and lyrics, which combine classical purity of form with an almost romantic idyllicism and love for nature, and with great beauty of expression.—W. S. PORTER.]

### ODE TO CHRIST CRUCIFIED.

1. O holy Lamb of God,  
     Bathed in that precious tide  
     By which thou settest all our sins apart,  
 Thou hangest on the Rood  
     With arms extended wide,  
     As if they fain would draw me to thy heart.  
     Now dying as thou art,  
 I see the heavenly light  
     And beauty of thy face  
     Begin to fade apace;  
 But ere thy spirit high and pure takes flight  
     To win me Paradise,  
     O turn to me once more thy tender eyes.



2. And now thy love untold  
 Its utmost bounty shows,  
 And rends the veils that hide thy majesty;  
 In sufferings manifold  
 Thy life draws to its close,  
 And thou dost turn thy thorn-crowned head to see  
 Thy Mother's misery;  
 And from thy royal heart  
 Thou liftest up thy prayer,  
 Beseeching God to spare  
 The sinners whose sole advocate thou art;  
 Now that thou dost begin  
 To die, bethink thee, Lord, of my poor sin.

3. Here, where thou offerest  
 Such gifts so lavishly,  
 With hands that cruel nails hold open wide;  
 And dost make manifest  
 To wretched slaves like me  
 The pardon bought with thy heart's precious tide;  
 Where upon every side  
 Thou pourest mercy forth,  
 And wilt not be content  
 Till every drop be spent  
 Of that dear blood so infinite in worth;  
 Here, Saviour, I entreat,  
 Let me come first unto thy judgment-seat.

4. Behold, I beg thee now,  
 This trembling wretch who doth  
 Lie fast in the dark prison of his sin,  
 Yet fearing not that thou  
 Wilt look on him with wrath,  
 Who diest here pardon for us to win.  
 So dost thou glory in  
 The greatness of thy heart,  
 That weightiest sins best prove  
 The wonder of thy love,  
 For then thou showest most how fain thou art  
 To spill for men thy blood,  
 And by thy mercy make them new and good.

5. Though I go sorrowful  
 Beneath the heavy weight  
 Of sin, because in pride I did rebel  
 Against thy gentle rule,—  
 Only to find my state  
 Worse than before, in bondage unto hell;  
 And though I know full well  
 The burden of the past;  
 Boldly I come to thee,  
 Because, for love of me,  
 Thy feet with cruel nails are made so fast  
 Unto the bitter Rood,  
 Thou canst not turn away, even if thou would.



6. In good time am I come,  
 For now thou dost impart  
 Thy newly-covenanted gifts of grace  
 Freely to all and some  
 Who seek thy sacred heart;  
 Now as I humbly stand before thy face,  
 Thou, in one moment's space,  
 Thy Mother and thy friend  
 Each to the other givest,  
 The sorry thief thou shrivest,  
 And to the Father's hands thou dost commend  
 Thy soul;—shall I alone,  
 Among so many precious gifts, have none?

7. Behold, I am that son  
 Whose disobedience  
 Might justly forfeit all that was my right;  
 Yet thou hast said that none  
 Coming in penitence  
 Should fail to find thy mercy infinite.  
 So now, with heart contrite,  
 As death upon thee falls,  
 Weeping I clasp thy feet,  
 And of thy love entreat  
 That if thou still canst hear this voice that calls,  
 Thou wilt forgive and spare,  
 And make me, still thy son, once more thine heir.

8. I call to witness those  
 Who by thy Cross have stayed,  
 That thou hast bent thy dying head to me,—  
 For sign thy love bestows  
 The boon that I have prayed,  
 Hoping and trusting in thy clemency.  
 O wondrous majesty!  
 O love divine and true!  
 For seeing that of course  
 No testament hath force  
 Without the death of him that made it, thou,  
 Sublimely generous,  
 Diest to seal thy covenant with us.

9. O Song, I can no more!—  
 But let my tears supply  
 The place of words that I must leave unsung.  
 My heart such idle pleasures must abhor,  
 When earth and sun and sky  
 Weep to behold so pitiful a wrong.



## REVIEWS

THE BUILDING OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST: UNIVERSITY AND OTHER SERMONS. By the Rt. Rev. Arthur C. Headlam, C.H., D.D., Bishop of Gloucester.

No one is better fitted to speak to universities than is Dr. Headlam. Traditions of Oxford, and even more his work in varied ways for London University, above all as a Leader in its Theological Faculty, have given him rich experience. To clearness of mind he adds equal clearness of language; there is no mistaking what he means us to think and understand. *The Building of the Church of Christ*: no theme is more suitable for an English Bishop of to-day. He is never rhetorical; he is never sentimental; but his former pupils and his former colleagues will feel, as his diocesan clergy must, that beneath words which may seem cold and balanced, lacking the attractive glow on the familiar (sometimes, indeed, the over-familiar) speech of some preachers of to-day, there is a warmth of heart and a depth of sympathy most suited to a Father in God. It may well be that with such qualities there is naturally found a little impatience with those who hesitate to follow him as leader: some of our Modernist friends, and some of our extremest critics, may at times be irritated by what he says or by the way he puts his thoughts. One Cambridge sermon of his was certainly not welcomed by those who believe in a Christian Political Economy strangely akin to the programme of one of our political parties. This particular utterance was powerful, plain, and emphatic; it did exactly what the preacher intended, and the irritation it caused to some was a useful by-product of a clear-thinking mind and a vigorously-speaking preacher. Again, it may be said that no one is more rightly at home in a university pulpit than Dr. Headlam: to his words about his fellow-labourer Dr. Sanday some would like to join his tribute at Cambridge to Lightfoot. And the Sermon (XXV.) on "The Quiet Life," illustrated by a study of John Keble, as a poet inferior perhaps to Isaac Williams, lays stress not so much on the scholar's pursuit of truth as on the Christian's ideal of character as the great essential.

Here and there in this volume there are judgments which may be questioned: the Porta Nigra at Trier, for instance, embodies as nothing else does the imperial solidity of Rome, so that the greater appeal of Christian buildings, of course more sacred, is rather over-estimated (p. 3). The effect (or success) of the Inquisition in preventing freedom of discussion (p. 120) may



also be questioned, and it leaves out of sight the scholastic liberty of discussion so prevalent in academic life. But nothing could be better than his words about marriage and modern laxity, or on the unfortunate adoption of the term Transubstantiation, with its philosophic implications, its seeming clarity, and its real vagueness. As a former Professor of Dogmatic Theology Dr. Headlam again sees rightly the importance of dogma and the impossibility of an undogmatic Christianity. Here he is at his best.

All this makes it clear that any proposal by Dr. Headlam merits consideration, although not, of necessity, acceptance. He would be the last man to claim that any ecclesiastical proposals of his should be considered as weighted by his standing and character: he would, it must be thought, welcome discussion, and one such scheme, of great magnitude, far-reaching in its results, difficult to forecast in its consequences, assuredly demands such consideration. To criticism of his scheme for Reunion therefore we may now pass.

The Lambeth proposals were rightly held on all sides to breathe a truly Christian and apostolic spirit. But before long too instant hopes began to fade. Reunion with Presbyterians would be welcomed by all Churchmen, who recognize their great services to religion, their scholarship, and their constitutional vigour. But they seem well content with their position, and their consolidation in Scotland, admirable for its caution and carefulness, may well make them even more so. There is less in many ways to separate us from the Wesleyans, and their reception of the Lambeth proposals has been, perhaps, more favourable. Of the Congregationalists it is more difficult to speak, for they seem, as is not surprising, more divided among themselves. We Churchmen may well feel a little disappointed: our hopes were, to begin with, unduly high: too many of us forgot that the proposals were meant for the future and for a working out in time, rather than for immediate effect. In such conditions impatience arises easily, and impatience is specially harmful in sacred matters. And this scheme for Reunion seems to be a result of such impatience: it takes much in the present and even more in the future too easily for granted. We are not now concerned with details, but the scheme demands as its foundation the recognition of non-episcopal Orders.

Dr. Headlam rightly looks upon Reunion as a necessity of full Christian life, has his own plan for it, which he puts forth in his Bampton Lectures, and quite lately in his Presidential Address at the Church Congress he has repeated with greater detail; he has also embodied it in a plea to the Presbyterians (*Church Quarterly Review*, October, 1928). Any scheme urged by



him has behind it not only the support of his scholarship joined to a gift of lucid and unmistakable expression, but of his vigorous personality joined to his experience of public affairs and powers of organization. These are great advantages, and might naturally lead us to give any scheme of his suggestion a too ready acceptance. But it should also be said that any plan for Reunion, so vital a matter for the whole future of the Church of Christ, must be considered solely upon its merits and possibilities, in the first place with the greatest caution since a mistake would be fatal, and in the second place with the experience of the Church's past before us, as well as with our hopes for its future.

His scheme comes to this. The difficulties of the present position are so great, the apparent impossibility of overcoming what may be called constitutional discord and differences so great, that the Church of England ought to take a bold step and recognize all orders as valid: this, he thinks, would give a basis for further closer union, and as he considers, with his eye upon Lausanne, would lead in time to a general acceptance of the historic episcopate. Such a scheme demands, as it seems to many, the most cautious consideration and criticism.

When the last Lambeth Conference met and put out its views on Reunion, everyone was hopeful. True Christian charity was, as it were, in the atmosphere as well as in the heart. But the authors of that noble utterance rightly held it to be something which could only be wrought with actual deed in the course of long years of prayer and fellowship. Popular opinion seemed to go further and to expect some almost immediate result. Then something of disappointment came upon many, and they became impatient. Something of such impatience seems, to me at any rate, to underlie Dr. Headlam's proposals now more elaborated before the world.

It has often been said that the Church of England holds in this great matter a central position, and this is historically true. It has accepted the threefold ministry: the historic episcopate has been the foundation of its work: its appeal to it has been its strength alike in the face of the modern Papacy and of modern Protestant ministries. We are bound to ask ourselves, if such a central position would still be ours, if such an appeal would keep its force were we to carry out Dr. Headlam's suggestions. For hitherto the Church of England has, even if we take at the utmost some scattered cases of possible exception from Reformation times, and even if we give the fullest force to the treatment of foreign Churches, based itself upon the validity of episcopally ordained ministry. However much is made of these not too numerous personal exceptions, however much we



put aside the Reformers' view that some Continental bodies were of necessity unable to have such episcopal orders until happier times came when they would be able to secure them, there can be no doubt about the constitutional practice and the greatly developed working of the Anglican episcopate in post-Reformation centuries. We have only to look at our Dominions and our daughter Churches; we have only to look at our own vigorous life to-day, so largely due to that "historic episcopate" which Bishop Lightfoot called the backbone of the Church, to see what we have gained by adherence to this principle. We are bound to ask ourselves if we could keep all this were Dr. Headlam's plan carried out, or if we should still have that central position which, in this matter of Christian unity, has given to the Anglican Church an importance far beyond that due to the number of its adherents.

This may be matter for argument or for conjecture, but before taking any such step we must be convinced in argument and conjecture alike. For such a step would mean giving up what the Church of England has always held. No pressure of present difficulties, no impatience of the too slow coming of a full union, should affect us here.

Such an action would be that of the English Church alone, including, of course, our daughter Churches. But we ought surely to ask ourselves if in such a matter the Church of England has a right to act thus alone. It has inherited the episcopate and the threefold ministry from the early Catholic Church. Could it of its own right decree that other ministries should be held valid? Leaving aside, as Dr. Headlam would wish us to do, any special doctrine or view of the threefold ministry and Apostolic succession, there is still left the question of fact. We might agree that the whole Catholic Church acting together might make such a decree. A General Council might do it, but for the Church of England, of itself and for itself, to do so is surely a very different matter. It would be claiming for ourselves a final and complete power which we should have to be convinced was within our right. It would be an act of self-will which would impair our Catholicity, certainly in the eyes of others if not of ourselves.

Reunion with Rome may seem to be hopeless, at any rate for the present; reunion with the Eastern Church may seem to tarry, but such a step would, so far as one can see, make either impossible. And it should not be forgotten that it would also greatly strain the loyalty of many among ourselves. We may be asked to take the threefold ministry as a fact, and not to be over-curious about the doctrine which many hold to be involved. That may be matter for argument and discussion, but many



faithful and devoted sons of our Church would see in the acceptance of non-episcopal orders something impossible for themselves and a condemnation of all the past history of our Church.

For it has long been held that owing to its acceptance and preservation of the threefold ministry combined with its Reformation settlement, our Church has a central position and reaches out its hands in opposite directions. The recognition of non-episcopal orders, even if meant to be only temporary and made once for all without repetition, surely foregoes the advantage of our position, and makes us far less powerful as agents for Reunion.

All that has been said refers to our own Church at home and its stable daughter Churches; difficulties in the mission field and suggestions from its younger Churches are left aside. But we must not forget the Church's methods in the past and lessons easily drawn from it. It was always for the younger Churches to grow after the example of the greater Church from which they sprang; in this way Europe was evangelized and trained; in this way our daughter Churches grew. Difficulties in the mission field were felt, but they were never taken as an indication of a new policy which should be adopted. Old lines and old discipline were kept, and so Christianity spread and triumphed.

The Church of England has, at the present, a chance of developing with fulness of spirit and power its heritage of primitive episcopacy. The history of the last hundred years has shown us what can be done, but it is no less clear that much remains still to be done. The late revival of diocesan synods, an excellent result of recent unhappy events, has indeed shown us this. We have still much to do within our own borders. This we too often overlook.

There have been moments in our history when the recognition of non-episcopal orders might well have seemed a short way to spiritual success. The investigation of our records to discover and accumulate single instances of such recognition in the century following the Reformation is in itself illuminating and interesting. But it does not affect the principles and the constitutional standard of our Church. Such cases are isolated and became rarer and rarer as years went on. There can be no question of our standpoint as a Church, and as it has become firmer our power and influence have become greater. This could be illustrated, if time and space allowed, not only from our more insular history, but from that of our daughter Churches. And the study of the isolated cases mentioned above may be called illuminating, because it is in essence an attempt to show,



what is contrary to our Church history as a whole, that the English Church was not always what it is to-day.

Now our Reformation or our Restoration Churchmen might well have seen in some plan such as Dr. Headlam puts before us a ready road to national unity. But had they done so, how different later history would have been! Everything would have been altered; our central position would have disappeared; our modern vigour and revival would have been impossible. Union in its fullest sense, including Rome and the Eastern Church, would have been impossible. It would have meant, as said before, a reversal of our whole history, and history is the foundation of life.

Precedents have, in ecclesiastical history, a way of repeating themselves: mediæval and modern history show this, and Papal history does the same. Had our Church either in the past or in the present recognized non-episcopal orders, whether from policy or from expediency, it would have become such a precedent. And it would be the same to-day.

Other religious bodies have shifted their foundation. We need not speak of the Roman Church. But the Presbyterians of to-day would hardly follow their Elizabethan predecessors in asserting the sinfulness of episcopacy. Congregationalists with their closer organization have departed from the ideal of each congregation as a gathered body independent and complete in itself. But we have grown more and more into our episcopal system, and it has moulded us more and more. It is difficult to see exactly how the scheme now put forward would work; it seems only too likely to result in confusion. It is neither our duty nor our pleasure to say or even think hard things of others. But to treasure and to use to the fullest what God has given to us is our bounden duty and service. We can do it with all charity to others and with thankfulness to Him who has taught us and led us so far in wonderful ways.

J. P. WHITNEY.

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PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY. Volume I., The Soul and its Faculties. By F. R. Tennant, D.D. Cambridge University Press. 21s.

The moment that any parish priest begins seriously to turn in the direction of study, he is met by the difficulty, first of questions concerning what to read, and secondly how to read with profit. A mere skimming of the surface of books of a popular kind, designed to make theology easy when it was never intended so to be, is but a waste of time which can ill be spared. We have to make up our minds once and for all



that study means hard work. We have quite definitely to regard it as a discipline and to be prepared in consequence to take pains and, if need be, to suffer hardship.

How shall we begin?

We have, on the one side, our Bible and our Christian doctrine; on the other side, our modern knowledge in every department of human thought and research.

Theology as a science was at one time the Queen of the sciences and may yet be crowned afresh as such. Clearly we need some guidance in the bearing of secular sciences upon sacred learning. Who shall be our guide? There are not a few who can help us. Dr. Tennant aspires to be one. He has embarked upon a comprehensive effort to supply students of philosophical theology with a guide-book to their studies. The student of theology, we are reminded, needs to know what is known, and to be acquainted with the main types of theory, concerning the self as knower, its capacities and faculties, and concerning the world and our science thereof, in so far as such knowledge bears upon his own quest. He must therefore be equipped with learning in psychology and theory of knowledge; he must have some acquaintance with the facts and theories, with the methods and limitations, of the natural sciences; and he must be familiar with the outstanding systems of metaphysics. Happily, there is much in these vast fields which it does not behove even the complete theologian to study. At the outset of his course, however, the student is not in a position always to discern what portions of them he can afford to neglect, as having no indirect relevance; to estimate the relative importance of topics that seem relevant; or to associate scattered items between which riper learning would see connexion.

Accordingly, Dr. Tennant offers his work to meet this need. Those who have been privileged to attend his lecture-room are no longer to enjoy exclusively the benefits of that privilege. Dr. Tennant by publishing this volume and promising to follow it up by further contributions aims at reaching a far wider circle of those who are willing to accept his guidance and allow him to do for them the selective work which may save them from reading a multitude of treatises and bring them at once face to face with the essential problems confronting the student of philosophical theology.

Since it is through knowledge about the self, mankind, and the world that developed belief in God is mediated, and since it is in relation to such knowledge, its nature, presuppositions, scope, and validity, that the intellectual status of theology, and the reasonableness of theistic conviction, are to be estimated, Dr. Tennant, in Vol. I., accordingly deals with the human



self, and with the mental functions of the social individual that are involved in scientific and theological thought.

There are chapters on Data and Method in Psychology and Philosophy; on Consciousness: its subject and subjective elements; on what is in the senses and the mind itself; on Perception, Imagination, Memory, Ideation; on the Self and the Soul; on the Empirical Self and Personality; on Valuation and Theory of Ethical Value; on Thought and Reason; on Theories of Knowledge; on Induction and Probability: Knowledge, Belief and Faith; on Religious Experience; on the nature and limitations of scientific knowledge.

A further volume is promised in which the theistic interpretation of the world will be discussed, in the light of the prolegomena set forth in this volume and with the aid of the conclusions to which the propædæutic studies pursued in Vol. I. are taken to point.

It will thus be seen that Dr. Tennant proposes to lay his foundations carefully and firmly before attempting to build. Students will naturally be over-eager to peruse what Vol. II. contains, and they may be tempted to pass over the more philosophical contents of Vol. I. in favour of what will be felt to be more congenial and familiar matter in Vol. II. Here precisely will lie their mistake, and it is worth stressing the point, because our failure in far too many recent volumes has been to attempt constructive efforts in matters theological without first deciding upon any agreed philosophical presuppositions. This is fatal, and it accounts for the failure of more than one volume of collected essays dealing with theological problems. It is becoming increasingly doubtful whether any one Christian thinker will be able to fulfil the rôle of the modern Aquinas. The work will have to be something in the nature of a corporate effort on the part of a selected band of thinkers who succeed in attaining a common mind and a common world view. Clearly the first requisite for any such constructive effort must be an agreed Christian Philosophy, or at least a large measure of agreement over a wide field in philosophical theology.

Whether Dr. Tennant's massive work may prove to be a distinct and valuable contribution to any such effort remains to be seen. The question can only be answered after scholars of all schools of thought have studied it with that care and critical discernment which its outstanding merits clearly deserve. We may certainly commend it warmly to all students of theology.

There is a growing feeling that a fruitful effort at the representation of Christianity in terms of modern thought may be essayed upon the basis of what is termed "religious experience." Several volumes have already appeared in the Library of



Constructive Theology, the contributors to which are agreed upon this as a starting-point. Those of us, however, who feel that any such foundation will ultimately prove inadequate for the reconstruction of Christian Dogma, will turn with interest to Dr. Tennant's searching chapter on Religious Experience. His criticism of "ineffable experiences," and his contention that because these baffle description and are incommunicable, they must ever remain occult as to their nature, would seem to cut at the very nerve of the argument from them to truth. When the experient claims for such experiences a revelation of supra-rational *truth*, he is using the wrong word. Knowledge of ineffable truth, Dr. Tennant maintains, is a contradiction in terms. If truth be correspondence of thought with reality, there cannot be truth, whatever else there may be, where there is no thought. His conclusion is that though there may be more in the universe than normal experience can understand or comprehend, the occult nature of the ineffable alleged revelations of mystical contemplation prevents their being safely included in the denotation of "truth." The experiences vouch nothing beyond their own occurrence; they are devoid of significance for "knowledge," in any of the several senses of that word which have become established through reference to explorable contexts. Dr. Tennant is concerned to analyze various kinds of mystical experience, and he submits the work of William James to some searching tests. Clearly, if we agree that there is no psychological ground for the belief that the mystic's visions are veridical, and that the validity of religious experience cannot be established by the *ipse dixit* of that type of experience, "the fertile bathos of experience" is no sure foundation for Theism.

Dr. Tennant shows clearly that science and religion differ in respect of the kind of "verification" which their respective postulations receive. Moreover, the religious postulates are not so inevitable, at any rate *prima facie*, as those of physical knowledge; and they involve a further venture of faith. His conclusion is that the objective determination of religious experience needs, unlike the impressional core of scientific knowledge, to be shown to be other than imaginal and ideal. This is the fundamental task of philosophical theology, and to it Dr. Tennant proposes to address himself in another volume.

Our need is a philosophy of revelation as well as a philosophy of redemption. The question which must present itself to readers of Dr. Tennant's introductory volume is whether what he has left himself, after his searching criticism, is sufficient upon which to build up so vast an edifice as religion in general or Christianity in particular demands.



We would venture the suggestion that perhaps the best immediate use which could be made of Dr. Tennant's first volume would be for a selected band of advanced students to agree to meet together over an extended period of time at fixed intervals, for the express purpose of studying Dr. Tennant's contribution as a possible basis of agreement in the building up of a modern Apologetic for the Christian Faith. Where scholars found themselves quite unable to accept certain of the positions reached by Dr. Tennant, the discipline of a sustained effort at studying his contribution would itself be of great profit in so far as it would undoubtedly force any of us who differ from him to understand more clearly than before not only that we differ but precisely why. Dr. Tennant is the declared foe of all loose thinking, and although his style of writing and the somewhat heavy manner of presentation make his pages difficult to follow, he leaves us with little excuse for any failure on our part, either to understand his positions or the reasons which have led him to his considered judgments in the whole field of philosophical theology, to which this work is a notable contribution.

H. MAURICE RELTON.

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## NOTICES

THE NEW AND LIVING WAY: A STUDY IN THE HOPE OF MANKIND. By T. H. Passmore. Faith Press. 4s.

This is a remarkable book, full of original and stimulating thought. The main thesis is that there is no basis for belief in immortality except Divine Revelation, and no way of obtaining it except by means of the new life implanted in our race by the Incarnate Son of God. The author's purpose is to interpret the Catholic religion in terms of evolution. Some of his speculations are extremely daring. He thinks he can save the historical character of Adam by admitting that he was not the first man: and he holds that the Revelation of St. John was written towards the close of the reign of Claudius, that it is "palpably quoted in almost every book of the New Testament," and that it describes in cryptogram the events which preceded the accession of Vespasian. The passage which begins "To what purpose man, but to be the aliment of God?" (p. 138) appears to us very unsatisfactory. Mr. Passmore admits that "the Scriptures are reticent on this subject." They are indeed! Again, his eschatological theories are unusual. He believes, apparently, that the Resurrection takes place immediately after death. It will be seen that the book is not so much an exposition of the teaching of the Church, as a highly original interpretation of it. The style, though not so obscure as in some of the author's other books, is still trying to the fastidious, or, as Mr. Passmore would say, the "picksome."

C. B. Moss.



**THE REAL PRESENCE, OR THE LOCALIZATION IN CULTUS OF THE DIVINE PRESENCE.** By A. C. Bouquet, D.D. Cambridge Press. 4s.

Dr. Bouquet calls attention to a "curious human drift or tendency to employ symbols charged with strong emotional significance for purposes of concentration and renewal especially in religion" (p. 92). "The simplificatory processes of religious reformers often end in the return of the jungle of natural religion" (p. 93). Thus it was in India after the reform made by the Buddha. Thus it was in the Church—the process is rapidly sketched in pp. 46-51—in contradiction of the work of our Lord, who was "humanly speaking Quaker in his attitude to the world around," and built deliberately on "the solid foundation of Jewish monotheism with its dislike of symbols" (p. 53 f.). Thus, it is suggested, it may be in England today, in reaction to the work of the Reformers; and this book is, apparently, intended as a help in the necessary "resistance to this return of the jungle" (p. 93). The charge of "idolatry" is delivered from a good deal of its sting in the course of the essay: but at best it represents an inferior stage of religion. The tolerance of our Lord is claimed for "the psychological make-up of so many human beings which prevents them from apprehending the spiritual presence of God or of appropriating His gifts save through sacramental emblems" (p. 54); but "the localiser like the Pharisaic Judaiser of the early apocalypticist may well belong to an order which is ready to vanish away" (p. 94).

This essay is, then, not simply an attempt to strengthen the hands of those who deprecate the adoration of our Lord in direct association with the reserved Elements, but it is, in effect, a tolerant defence of the Quaker position in regard to sacramentalism, disputing kindly but firmly, on the basis of material provided by the comparative study of religion, Catholic teaching in respect of the Real Presence. For Dr. Bouquet there is no difference, it would appear, between the water used in Holy Baptism and the consecrated Bread and Wine in the sacrament of the altar (p. 77). In both cases we have symbols "charged with meaning." Adopting Dr. Rashdall's definition of the locality of divine action ("A spirit is where it acts") the author says that the divine presence is localized "in the occasion when a material substance is used, rather than in the substance itself" (p. 44). But what meaning can be attached to the phrase "localisation in an occasion"? If it is to be made intelligible it must be amended to "localisation *during* an occasion"; and the Catholic position is then at once in sight. Reservation admittedly involves the reduction of the activity of the "occasion" to a temporary quiescence; and error enters with the view that the focus of the special activity becomes the locus of a special Presence. Then Dr. Bouquet's warnings become necessary and urgent. But in the form in which he has cast his essay I suggest that he proves too much.

O. HARDMAN.

**RELATIVITY AND RELIGION.** An inquiry into the implications of the theory of relativity with respect to religious thought. By H. Douglas Anthony, Ph.D. University of London Press. 6s.

*Relativity and Religion* is an attempt to express Christianity in terms of modern thought. Dr. Anthony has therefore given us first a sketch of the relevant parts of the mathematical and metaphysical theory of



relativity. This is by far the most useful section of the book. Considering its purpose, however, it is disappointing to be denied a discussion of Professor Whitehead's definition of God as the "Principle of Concretion." "The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason" (*Science and the Modern World*, p. 250).

Two important facts emerge: first, the unimportance of "the observer" except to himself, since laws of nature expressed in mathematical formulæ remain unchanged for the space-time co-ordinates of different observers, and this leads on to a discussion of the relatedness and interdependence of events; secondly, that discontinuity is a fundamental law of nature. This is hardly referred to again, but it contradicts a quotation from Dr. Matthews given on the first page: "The modern view of the world differs from the ancient and mediæval in that we have today become permeated with the conception of continuity."

A third conclusion is hardly justified by the argument as it stands. "The principle of the relatedness of nature has led to an appreciation of a præter-nature, and the whole theory of extensive abstraction presupposes a relatedness and interdependence. Any particular event is significant of others and every science demands this præter-nature." So "præter-nature" is sprung upon us. Dr. Anthony assumes that this præter-nature is spiritual, and instead of investigating it from the scientific end and establishing what science demands of it, he goes at once to Christian doctrine for the "laws of præter-nature."

We have then an analysis of Christian doctrines into primary and secondary. Primary doctrines are those which express "laws of præter-nature," secondary doctrines either are theories about these laws or theories concerning religious institutions.

"First among doctrines of primary importance is the idea of God"; the second is given on p. 189 as "the importance of spiritual values in man's life"; the third is the doctrine of immortality.

He instances the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church, the Sacraments as examples of secondary doctrines. Though we are told they are not unimportant, Dr. Anthony allows us to understand that opinions about them will change and that one opinion is as good as another.

"The Sacraments may be regarded as symbolic of those spiritual laws associated with præter-nature, and many Christians find the solemn service of Holy Communion a real inspiration in life. . . . Within this position of secondary importance room can be found for the experience of the Quaker and also for those who appreciate the uplifting atmosphere of the Eucharist."

The concrete element in Christian revelation—i.e., just those facts which really demand a præter-nature for their explanation—is thus denied proper consideration. It is here that we regret the omission of the "Principle of concretion," which states that "God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality" (Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 249); on this view the doctrines concerning particular happenings are of the utmost importance. "What further can be known of God must be sought in the region of particular experiences" (*ibid.*, p. 250).

This section of the book is neither theological nor scientific and is most difficult to follow owing to the looseness of the language.

MARY HOSKYNs.



A WANDERER'S WAY. By Charles E. Raven, D.D. Martin Hopkinson. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Raven begins his preface by anticipating that reviewers will say that his book ought not to have been published. I do not think that such a judgment falls within a reviewer's right. But a reviewer may feel that he is set an insoluble problem, to review the book, and yet not to review Dr. Raven.

For the book is the story of Dr. Raven's life in relation to its central point, which is the author's conversion to a profound sense of the living reality of Jesus Christ. To that the account of the questionings and the perplexities, the hopes and aspirations of the schoolboy, the undergraduate, the worker in the Education Office and in a boys' club at Liverpool, leads up; from it the experiences of the Dean of a Cambridge College and of an army chaplain, the arguments of the one Christian member of a group of agnostics, the investigations of the student of the Gospels, the speculations of the theologian with his deep interest in, and considerable knowledge of, natural science, derive their form. Dr. Raven tells his story very candidly; he has the gift of saying much in a comparatively short space; he enables the reader to understand him. And there can be no doubt that he was as honest with himself as a man can hope to be in his subsequent scrutiny of that experience of Jesus which came to him in the room of a sick friend. There is and can be no guarantee of the trans-subjective validity of a psychological experience; but the problem of origins lies outside the scope of psychology, and no psychologist *quâ* psychologist would have any right to say that that problem was settled wrongly in the case of Dr. Raven.

It is on this side that I find the book most attractive. As a guide to the understanding of Dr. Raven's theology it is, though always interesting and well written, less successful. Dr. Raven's enthusiasms and his dislikes are clear enough; so is a certain violence of mind which leads to judgments too lacking in restraint and to contrasts of such exaggeration as is apparent in the assertion that "the difference between horses and a motor engine is not greater than that between the pre-scientific and the modern concept of God." But what the theology of the new era should be as a theology of and for the Christian Church is not made plain. This is true even of Christology, for I understand him to sympathize with the position of the "educated layman" that the universe does not leave room for Jesus Christ "if He is what the traditional orthodoxy teaches." I do not wish to imply for a moment that Dr. Raven's Christology, despite unfortunate expressions, is what is sometimes called a "low" Christology; but I do not think it unfair to say that his quarrel with what he regards as unintelligent conservatism blinds him to the fact that the traditional orthodoxy enshrines and safeguards the significance of Jesus. And as to the theological problem as a whole, the task of the presentation of Christian truth, with full attention to our enlarged knowledge of the world and man, is taken seriously by many who are convinced that the revolutionary way is not the way of true progress. Dr. Raven and those whose outlook is similar to his own are, however unintentionally, somewhat ungenerous in their failure to recognize the work that is being done from within the Catholic tradition. It is at least arguable that the best all-round constructive work is coming from precisely that quarter.

Still, Dr. Raven did not write his book as a theological manifesto, but



as a document of personal religion. And because it reveals a spiritual life for which Christ is the centre, those who differ most from Dr. Raven the theologian may yet learn much from Dr. Raven the Christian.

J. K. MOZLEY.

THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS. The Third Book. Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers from the latest Leonine edition. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2 vols., 12s. each.

The first book of the *Summa contra Gentiles* treats of the existence of God and His nature; the second, of God as the Source of all created existence; the third, of God as the End, for whom all was created, and so, as the Governor of the world; the fourth, of God as revealed.

This latest instalment of the Dominican translation completes the third book. The translators are to be congratulated on the production of a version which for the most part runs admirably, and will prove readily intelligible to the general reader, who will probably prefer the straightforward discourse of this work to the disputations of the *Summa Theologica*. We can imagine such a reader really interested by such discussions as those of ch. xxvi. ff., "In what does human happiness consist?" or cxxii. ff., on the natural law of marriage. But an inevitable difficulty presents itself in the scholastic terminology; and occasionally we come across passages where the literal translation is really unintelligible, except to those who know scholastic Latin. Thus, in ch. cxliii. mortal sin is defined as that "the intention of the mind altogether breaks away from its order to God." The English word "order" does not explain itself: and it would seem that there is no solution except in some bold paraphrase, such as "From the purpose of serving God for which it was created." In another edition, might not such paraphrases be admitted as footnotes?

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

PAROCHIAL MISSIONS TODAY. By Peter Green. Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.

Canon Green has added to his works on pastoralia one on the place of parochial missions under modern conditions, a pleasant book combining wisdom and zeal, humanism and piety. It follows others by Canon Bell and Fr. King, C.R. This revival of interest in evangelism is welcome. The knowledge that men are thinking and working on the means to overcome modern difficulties in the way of evangelistic work brings hope and cheer to despondent or puzzled parish priests. These three authors start from the same position. They look out from the light of the great tradition of missions in the closing era of last century into a more murky atmosphere.

Evangelism is more difficult today, its results smaller. Canon Green analyzes the causes and outlines some of the answers. This part of the book might have been fuller; for it is here that the parish priest wants advice and missionaries more knowledge. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the evangelist found his adequate weapon in parochial missions. They met many needs. Today symptoms have to be analyzed more carefully, and remedies are more specialized. England is more secular, also more social. There is the feminist movement. The piety of fifty



years ago was protestant; now it is increasingly catholic. The clergy are liberal, and know the constructive values of liberalism; the laity merely puzzled, and acquainted with its destructive side. The clergy are largely catholic, the laity protestant. These interior problems will have to come nearer solution before any great evangelistic campaign to the outsider can be successful. So pressing are these problems, that over and over again missions have been forced away from the appeal to the outsider to deal with the interior difficulties. To change objectives in the middle of an action is a difficult manœuvre. But a whole host of new methods have sprung up to meet new needs, retreats, open retreats, conventions, or teaching missions, congresses, women messengers, I.C.F. activities. From the point of view of the individual parish priest retreats and conventions are the most important; and both have got beyond the stage of amateurish experiment. That most urgent problem of the large one-priest parish is unfortunately still unsolved. Experiments should be made.

Now as to missions—what is their place? Canon Green writes as one more familiar with missions than with other methods. That is all to the good. If we want to learn about missions, let us go to the man experienced in them and to one old enough to remember former successes. Here is his judgment on the work of a mission: "The aim of a Parochial Mission is to induce men and women to make the great decision, and to accept Jesus as Saviour, Master and Lord." And it provides opportunities for sealing the decision. That is the objective of a mission: and though missions today do not produce as great results as in the last generation, yet there is no other way of producing conversions on anything like the same scale.

Unfortunately, most parishes are not strong enough to run a mission. Many have tried to do so without the necessary man-power and reserves of spiritual strength. They failed, just as the British army in 1915 failed. That does not mean that the offensive is impossible. But it means first that objectives should be chosen suitable for the strength of the particular parish; secondly, that whereas formerly a parish could be prepared for a mission in a year, now before preparations begin favourable conditions must be worked for and obtained—namely, an inner circle of faithful strong enough to act as successful missionaries, a fringe of people outside the church, but likely to come in, and a religion that has the friendly interest of the neighbourhood. No parish priest need hesitate to attempt evangelistic efforts, provided he undertakes them on a scale suitable to his strength; nor a mission, provided he will set to work and get the conditions necessary for success. And the modern evangelist has means to help him.

A correction of a small mistake of Canon Green—members of Religious Orders do not now take six to eight missions annually besides retreats, etc. Long ago they discovered that such an output was bad for the work, the missionary, and his community. As missionaries they will not now be stale or nervy from overwork.

RICHARD L. BARNES, C.R.

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OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR. By the Rev. Peter Green, M.A., Canon of Manchester. Longmans, Green and Co. 4s.

In two short chapters Canon Peter Green here offers us not a ready-made synopsis of the Christian faith, but methods by which those who seek after a closer personal relationship to our Lord may be helped in discovering it. No one can read the book without profit; its author is a



most skilful and sympathetic guide, and out of his rich store of pastoral experience he brings forth an abundance of happy illustrations and encouragements for the way.

E. GRAHAM.

**THE GOSPEL OF ST. PAUL.** A Reinterpretation in the Light of the Religion of his age and Modern Missionary Experience. By Sidney Cave, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.

Among the many books on St. Paul recently published, this book can claim a place of its own. Dr. Cave brings to the study of the New Testament not only a wide acquaintance with English and German literature on the subject, coupled with an independent judgment, but also a first-hand knowledge of the mission field. Thus he is able to approach the teaching of St. Paul from just that angle which it requires. He is able to recognize that St. Paul is primarily an evangelist and only secondarily a theologian. His rejection of the old-fashioned Protestant treatment of St. Paul's dogmatic statements is most welcome. His treatment makes St. Paul's teaching live. We are reluctant to point out defects in such an excellent book, but we cannot regard his treatment of St. Paul's doctrine of the Church and sacraments as on the same high level as the rest of the work. The passages on the Church are good as far as they go, but the Church hardly holds the same place in the mind of Dr. Cave as of St. Paul. The treatment should be fuller. On the sacraments he seems still entangled in the confusions of Protestant prejudice. The Catholic theory of sacramental grace is not necessarily magical. He is quite unable to assign to St. Paul's plain statements their full meaning. Apart from this we recommend this book heartily to students of all kinds. It is well informed and up to date on subjects like the Mystery-Cults. Above all, it presents the Gospel of St. Paul in terms of missionary life.

E. J. BICKNELL.

## BOOK NOTES

*Ad Clerum.* By S. P. T. Prideaux, D.D. Wardman. 1s. This must be one of the fullest forms of self-examination ever published. In such fullness there is an obvious snare. Once the beaten track of common Christian duty is left and the temptations of a particular calling are considered, the danger of triviality becomes pressing. The questions here provided include: "Do I ever go unshaved? Is the sin of ugliness . . . brought before the young? Are the vestry pens in order? Am I watchful over the Priest's special avenues of Temptation. . . . 'Parish Aunts' and 'Mothers in Israel'?" But it would be unfair to judge the pamphlet by these extravagances. Used with discrimination it will help a priest to undertake the zealous amendment of his whole life.

*A Certain Priest.* By B. M. Hancock. Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d. Of these Retreat Addresses, based on St. Luke's Gospel, the Bishop of Wakefield says in the Preface: "This set of meditations should be of great value to the clergy . . . any priest who followed the guidance of this book throughout a year by systematic meditation would find his ministry enlightened, quickened, and refreshed."

*A Bondman of the Lord: St. Paul's Life and Letters.* By H. S. C. E. S.P.C.K. and C.E.S.S.I. 2s. 6d. Very many teachers, both in Day and Sunday Schools, will be glad to know of this beautiful book by a Sister



of an English Community, which, following the guidance of such scholars as Rackham, treats the whole of St. Paul's life and epistles with sufficient fullness. The unhackneyed illustrations add to the value of the book, than which nothing better could be recommended to the fifth and sixth forms of Church secondary schools.

*Mrs. Eddy's "Christian Science."* By Leighton Pullan, D.D. Rivingtons. 2s. A very short and clear exposition of the errors of this "science falsely so called." It is too scanty to take the place of more thorough books, too unsympathetic to appeal to a Christian Scientist. But for lending to a Churchman who is attracted by the system and begins to think there is something in it the book is admirably fitted.

*God in Us: The World Faith of Quakerism.* By Daniel Gibbons (The Macmillan Company. 4s. 6d.) may be recommended to those who want an attractive American exposition of Quakerism. The old peculiarities have been shed. The Friends admit the authorities of Church and Bible, but subordinate them to the Voice of God within. The work of Quakerism is, *inter alia*, to effect a permanent reconciliation between faith and culture, to ensure that dogma and form shall not hinder the higher life of the race, etc. None of us will quarrel with this. But why does Mr. Gibbons speak of "the tragic example of Spain"? An impartial observer might conceivably prefer Spanish to American civilization.

*Does Civilization need Religion?* By R. Niebuhr. The Macmillan Company. 8s. 6d. This well-written study by an American minister who, according to the Dedication, shares his pastorate with his mother, is chiefly interesting to an English reader as showing the heart-searchings of modern Protestantism. Religion is dying in modern civilization and may not succeed in attaining rejuvenation in time. Protestant Christianity is morally impotent, not having thought out the ethical side of its message under modern conditions. Asceticism must be developed in a measure, without abandonment of the world to its fate. The Church must dissociate itself "from the dominant secular desires of the nations as well as from the greed of economic groups."

*The Eucharistic Fast.* By H. Thurston, S.J. Longmans. 1s. Readers of Dr. Dearmer's recent book, *The Truth about Fasting*, will have been impressed by the evidence there given that is unfavourable to the modern rigidity in enforcing the fast before Communion; clearly, if the facts are as stated, the conclusions follow. Fr. Thurston, with his accustomed learning, corrects Dr. Dearmer's facts where necessary and enlarges the field from which evidence is drawn. In particular, he points out that there is no evidence in ecclesiastical writers that *ieiunus* ever meant anything but one who had abstained from touching food or drink.

*Fiery Grains.* Longmans. 3s. 6d. Mr. H. R. L. Sheppard and Mr. H. P. Marshall have put together this Anthology of prose and poetry. It will be immensely popular as a gift book. Whether it will be much used depends on the recipient. Suppose a friend who wants a volume of what the Americans call "uplift" conceived in a thoroughly English, humorous, public-school spirit, without a trace of pretentiousness; who does not want religious teaching in such a book, and is sufficiently unsophisticated to appreciate a large proportion of not very pointed passages—and which of us has not scores of such friends?—and here is the book for him.

*The Primary Charge of the Bishop of Oxford.* Oxford University Press. 1s. Dr. Strong's charge, delivered at twelve centres in May, 1928



is reprinted in pamphlet form, some special diocesan matter having been eliminated. The subject is the modern attitude towards the Bible. It is almost an impertinence to say that the treatment is solid and strong, Anglican in the best sense. Whether a Bishop's Visitation should fitly consist of a small book written by the Diocesan, dealing with topics on which the more scholarly clergy have many books on their shelves, and read aloud in portions to the clergy, the less scholarly of whom follow the spoken word with some difficulty, is not a subject to be discussed in a literary note.

*An Apostle of Healing.* By H. Waylen. Stockwell. 2s. 6d. Richard Howton was born in 1855 and died in 1927. For most of his life he was minister of an unattached chapel at Glossop. He took the Bible literally, and had many remarkable experiences of answers to prayer, after the manner of George Muller of Bristol. He was over six foot high and weighed nineteen stone, possessed psychic gifts of clairvoyance and clairaudience, and dominated people by his physical personality besides impressing them by his goodness. Every year saw a succession of marvellous healings, wrought by prayer and unction, including cures of appendicitis and cancer, so it is said. His methods were not ours, but we thank God for such lives.

*Twenty Years as Archbishop of York.* By Charles Herbert. Wells Gardner, Darton and Co. 2s. 6d. A Life of an ecclesiastic written during his lifetime, for such is this book about Archbishop Lang, can hardly be other than a panegyric. If there is a place in the Church's life for such a book, it is admirably filled by Mr. Herbert's sketch. He has skilfully avoided certain errors in taste that marred his book on the Bishop of London, and the straightforward record of familiar facts here to be found will doubtless interest many people.

*John Bunyan in Relation to his Times.* By E. A. Knox, D.D. Longmans. 3s. 6d. Short chapters on the background upon which we must view Bunyan's literary achievement by a writer who in his old age repays the debt he owes to *The Pilgrim's Progress*, "the first book that, in my boyhood, brought religion for me out of the region of confused mystery into that of practical reality, and gave purpose and meaning to life." Bishop Knox's occasional use of seventeenth-century happenings as a whip for the back of his ecclesiastical opponents today does not detract from the charm and value of this book, which has a place of its own in the abundant Bunyan literature called forth by the recent Tercentenary.

*The Literary Background of the New Testament.* By G. L. Hurst. The Macmillan Co. 6s. 6d. The first part of this book by a Canadian scholar deals with the literary forms such as Hebrew poetry, the Epistle, Apocalypses, etc., represented in the New Testament or forming part of its background; based largely upon the work of scholars like Drs. Burney, Deissmann, and Charles. The second part writes out in English the passages in the Oxford *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha* thought to be quoted or echoed in the New Testament. The book will introduce the reader who knows no Greek to some interesting lines of thought, the importance of which he may be tempted to exaggerate. One cannot be quite certain of the judgment of the author, who quotes with approval a statement that our Lord owes His certainty and peace largely to a study of (apparently) the non-canonical literature, and compares it to a mountain range with high peaks visible behind and above the New Testament.



*Reinspecting Victorian Religion.* By G. G. Atkins (The Macmillan Co., 7s. 6d.), is the not very happy title of a work of literary criticism comparing the religious outlook of Tennyson and Browning, much as the middle-aged amongst us used to do in their essays at school or college thirty years ago. The poems studied are *Gleanings of Europe*, *Abt Vogler*, *Saul*, *The Ring and the Book*, and *The Idylls of the King*. The point of view is that the last-named, for instance, reveals to us not so much the spirit of primitive Britain as that of Victorian England. But let no one conclude that the lesson is trite and the book unnecessary. On the contrary, these lectures are exceptionally vigorous and inspiring, and calculated to send the reader back to these great writers with new appreciation. Dr. Atkins maintains that the perfection of Tennyson's form often distracts us from the profundity of his thought, and that while we rightly discount Browning's optimism we cannot anywhere find more searching analysis of the facts of human life.

*Sermon Outlines.* By M. Donovan. Mowbray. 5s. Mr. Donovan, whose vigorous and thoughtful sermons have edified so many congregations, has taken the trouble to write out 115 Sermon Outlines for the Sundays of the Christian Year and some Holy days. That preachers should use them only as a model is no doubt his desire, for he cannot wish them to preach his own sermons and be accused of plagiarism; but he must reckon with the possibility of their being widely used. And indeed, if the clergy must use other men's structures as a basis for their sermons, they are strongly advised to buy this book.

*Moral Adventure.* By B. H. Streeter. S.C.M. 2s. 6d. A reprint from the well-known book of essays called *Adventure* of the chapter dealing with morality, with special attention to the ethics of sex.

*The Riddle of Life.* By Neville S. Talbot, D.D. Longmans. 2s. 6d. This little book by the Bishop of Pretoria is very much what a popular book should be. A large part of it is made up of quotations from Baron von Hügel, Dr. Cairns, Dr. Fosdick, and other writers, aptly woven into the text, which state the problem exceedingly well, and though they do not pretend to give a complete answer, yet point the way to the solution that each man must work out for himself. There is no writing down to an assumed popular level, but a real and successful effort to raise readers to a worthy plane of thought. But is the world really so occupied with the problems of evil and suffering as this and many similar books would lead us to suppose? Perhaps it is, so far as the sensitive and highminded are concerned. But the bulk of humanity seems to be enjoying itself fairly well, and sometimes one wonders whether a severer and more bracing message than that which soothes pain and resolves doubts would not elicit more response.

W. K. L. C.



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